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GOVERNING THE URBAN WATER COMMONS: 
ESSAYS ON COLLABORATIVE POLICY NETWORKS IN A POLYCENTRIC 
ECOLOGY OF URBAN WATER POLICY GAMES 
 
Emmanuel Frimpong Boamah 
December 7, 2016 
 
Governing social-ecological systems, such as the urban water commons, is a multi-scale 
and multi-sector (polycentric) human-environment process. This dissertation interrogates 
this process by situating itself within the Ecology of Games Framework by Norton Long 
(and updated by Mark Lubell) and the literature on polycentric governance by the 
Bloomington School of Political Economy.  The dissertation’s three essays 1) offer both 
theoretical and methodological means to enact polycentric public economies within the 
ecology of games framework, and 2) explicate the conditions under which 
interoganizational collaboration is fostered within a polycentric ecology of policy games 
in governing the Middle Rio Grande urban watershed. First, it deploys a synthesized 
theoretical construct which puts into conversation three theoretical paradigms to excavate 
the conceptual pillars to study the polycentricity of urban water governance in the United 
States. A novel conceptual tool is hereby constructed to help engage the thoughts that 
polycentricity is not the antithesis of monocentricity but the co-constitution of actors at 
multiple governing scales and within multiple sectors. Second, the conceptual pillars are
vii 
 
reworked into theoretical and methodological models to study the polycentricity of 
governing the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) urban watershed in New Mexico, USA. Four 
indices are developed to measure the level of political, market, nonprofit, and overall 
polycentricity in governing this urban water commons. Employing multiple methods like 
the social network analysis, social-ecological network analysis (SENA), and regression 
analysis, the dissertation’s findings suggest that polycentric water governance could 
primarily be about the politics of power and resource distribution, the reconfigurations of 
actors’ positionalities as they align themselves and their interests strategically. This, among 
other findings in the dissertation, points to the need to centralize the politics of power and 
resource distribution in the study of polycentricity in social-ecological governance.  Third 
and finally, the overall polycentric index is used to model the role of polycentricity in 
interorganizational collaboration within the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) urban water 
commons. The exponential random graph models (ERGMs) is used in this analysis. Among 
other findings, the results show that polycentric governance increases the probability of 
interorganizational collaboration within the MRG. The implications of the dissertation’s 
three cohesive essays to theory, methods and policy are discussed in the conclusion chapter 
of the dissertation. In all, this dissertation concludes that there is still no panacea in 
governing the (urban water) commons. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background: Collaborative Policy Networks in Governing Social-
ecological Systems 
The tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968) is ipso facto a tragedy of governance. 
The Global Water Partnership (GWP), for instance, describes the water crisis as “…mainly 
a crisis of governance” (Global Water Partnership, 2002, p. 17). A growing concern in 
environmental policy is to identify factors motivating self-interested actors to supply the 
institutions needed to save the commons (Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, & Mete, 2002; E. 
Ostrom, 1990; Edella Schlager, 1994; Schneider, Scholz, Lubell, Mindruta, & Edwardsen, 
2003; Scholz & Stiftel, 2005). The governance/institutional tragedy is seen as the second 
order collective action dilemma (Bates, 1988; E. Ostrom, 1990).1 This tragedy needs to be 
solved in order to address the first order dilemma—imminent tragedy facing the commons. 
At the frontier of water governance research, therefore, are the development and testing of 
theoretical and empirical factors influencing the supply of different institutional 
arrangements to deal with the second order collective action dilemma (Berardo & Scholz, 
2010; Feiock & Scholz, 2009; Lubell et al., 2002; Schneider et al., 2003; Scott, 2015). 
                                                          
1The undersupply of institutions to avert the second order collective action dilemma relates to transaction 
cost and benefits (see detailed discussion on this on page 145 of Schneider et al., 2003) 
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Collaborative policy networks remain central in recent inquiries into addressing the 
second order collective action dilemma.2 Policy is seen here as the conscious change in 
institutional rules to engender systematic changes in outputs and outcomes capable of 
meeting targeted social needs (Lubell, Scholz, Berardo, & Robins, 2012, p. 355). Changes 
in institutional rules (macro-level) and the decision-making rules (micro-level) of 
individuals are, however, embedded within a complex web of social relationships 
(Granovetter, 1985).  Borrowing from network theory and methods, policy networks have 
emerged as a “meso-level” concept to interrogate relationships between “institutional rules 
(both formal and informal) and individual behavior (citizens, politicians, or organizations)” 
within the complex web of social relationships (Evans, 2001; Lubell et al., 2012; Rhodes, 
1997). Environmental policy networks, for example, are an emerging network governance 
structure fostering collaboration and cooperation among autonomous actors to address the 
second order collective action dilemma (Bodin & Crona, 2009; Lin, 2001; Lubell et al., 
2002; Schneider et al., 2003). The central question, however, is and has always been: what 
conditions must exist for autonomous actors to form collaborative policy networks? 
In addressing different dimensions of the above question, different frameworks, 
theories and methods have been advanced. In her seminal piece, Ostrom’s (1990, p. 25) 
key proposition3—self-organized and self-governing individuals can solve the collective 
action dilemma—has been crucial in current conceptual, theoretical and methodological 
advances in dealing with the second order collective action dilemma. Some of these 
                                                          
2Collaborative governance and policy networks are often treated as synonyms (see Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 
547). 
3She uses this proposition to reject the premise and prescriptions of the three theoretical orthodoxies—tragedy 
of the commons, prisoners dilemma, and collective action dilemma—as the “only way” of analyzing 
institutional supply in governing the commons (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 13). 
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frameworks and theories include the institutional analysis and development (IAD) 
framework (E. Ostrom, 1990, 1999b), the Common Pool Resource theory (E. Ostrom, 
Gardner, & Walker, 1994), and the institutional collaborative action (ICA)framework 
(Feiock & Scholz, 2009; Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009)4. While acknowledging the 
relative superiority of the IAD framework and the CPR theory (Edella Schlager, 2007; 
Edella Schlager & Blomquist, 1996), the applicability of this framework to the urban 
commons has been questioned (Dagan & Heller, 2001; Garnett, 2011; Harvey, 2011).5 
Harvey (2011, p. 102), for instance, succinctly looks at the Ostrom framework as suffering 
from “… [an] unanalyzed ‘scale problem’…” Analyzing the factors that condition the 
emergence of collaborative policy networks at the urban scale is still an underexplored 
area in the literature. This dissertation seeks to add to the dearth of knowledge in this area. 
1.2 Study Overview: Polycentric Ecology of Urban Water Policy Games 
1.2.1 Setting: The Urban Water Commons/Watershed 
The ‘urban’ is treated as the big container constituted by many “commons” such as 
the “water commons.” The urban water commons and urban watershed is used 
interchangeably in this dissertation. The commons idea is used narrowly here to refer to 
the establishment of collective property claims over certain resources within the urban (e.g. 
land, water, housing, etc.) through their sustained use and appropriation (Blomley, 2008; 
Gillespie, 2016). Eizenberg notes the limitation of the contemporary use of the word 
commons because existing commons are only “live relics of the ideal of the commons; they 
are never complete and perfect and may even have components that contradict the ideal 
                                                          
4 See detailed description of these and other frameworks and theories in Sabatier (2007) 
5See Garnett (2011)for detailed discussions on the urban and liberal commons. 
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type’ (Eizenberg, 2012, p. 765). The urban water commons as used in this dissertation, 
however, helps to convey the specificity of the resource in the urban being studied, the 
multiplicity of collective property claims that are often made over this resource, and the 
scale dilemma associated with this urban resource.   
In studying certain aspects of the urban, such as the environmental commons, 
especially the water and air commons, scholars must confront the ‘scale dilemma’—what 
is the appropriate scale to study water resources in a particular geographic space? For 
example, water resources are studied at the watershed, problem-shed or policy-shed scales 
(see detailed discussions on these in Cohen & Davidson, 2011; Griffin, 1999; Islam & 
Repella, 2015). The problem here is that there are often asymmetries of these scales, where 
the problem affects an extensive—multi-jurisdictional—geographic scope (extensive 
problem-shed) but policies are often made by individual jurisdictions (non-extensive 
policy-shed) (Cohen & Davidson, 2011; Islam & Susskind, 2012). Hence, the choice of 
scale must hence blend scientific and political reasoning (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005).  
The urban watershed scale offers a blend between scientific and political reasoning, 
which also reflects the scale where the watershed, the problem-shed and the policy-shed 
scales approximately converge (cf. Grimm, Grove, Pickett, & Redman, 2000; Kaushal & 
Belt, 2012). It is defined as the “…drainage units entirely or substantially within 
metropolitan regions, not major rivers that flow through or past cities like the Hudson at 
New York or the Mississippi at St. Louis and New Orleans.” (Platt, 2006, p. 29). The U.S. 
Geological Survey has a four tier classification system and the last category “Cataloguing 
Units or HUC-8” provides the drainage of networks at the urban-metropolitan scale (ibid). 
Even though these designated urban watersheds have clearly defined boundaries, there is a 
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multi-scalar collective property claims over each of these urban watersheds—making it a 
multi-scale, geopolitical arena whereby policy, politics and science converge to define the 
wicked or complex nature of problems characterizing the urban watershed (see also Islam, 
Gao, & Akanda, 2010; Rittel & Webber, 1973). This dissertation views the urban 
watershed/commons as the ideal “policy space” (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 142) to study the 
outcomes from a collective-choice process—interorganizational collaborations to govern 
the urban water commons. 
1.2.2 Governing the Urban Water Commons as a Polycentric Ecology of Water Policy 
Games 
“…man is both a game-playing and a game creating animal, that his capacity to create and play games 
and take them deadly seriously is of the essence…” (Long, 1958, p. 252) 
In this dissertation, the study of interorganizational collaboration in governing the 
urban water commons is situated within two theoretical constructs—the “ecology of 
games” (Long, 1958, p. 251; Lubell, 2013) and polycentric governance (McGinnis, 2015; 
E. Ostrom, 1990, 2010a; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]; V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). It 
seeks to properly contextualize (by hypothesizing and testing) the role of polycentric 
governance within the ecology of games framework. To achieve this, the dissertation 
concerns itself with three questions, which are answered by the three papers/essays forming 
the next three chapters of the dissertation. These questions include: 
1. What does it mean to conceptualize the governance of social-ecological systems (e.g. 
the urban water commons) as a polycentric governance system—i.e. what is a 
polycentric urban water governance system? 




3. How is interorganizational collaboration in governing the urban water commons 
shaped by polycentric governance? 
The ecology of games considers governance as the concurrent operation of multiple 
policy games at different points in time (Long, 1958; Lubell, 2013). A policy game 
comprises the interactions among policy actors as they participate in a policy institution—
a rule-governed collective decision-making process (Lubell, 2013, p. 538). A policy game 
is populated by policy actors participating in a policy institution or “collective-choice 
rules” that creates “operational rules” in dealing with a policy issue (e.g. water supply or 
pollution) in a geographically defined policy system (Lubell, 2013, p. 540; E. Ostrom, 
1990; Scharpf, 1997b). A policy system is a geographically defined territory (e.g. urban 
watersheds) comprising multiple policy issues (e.g. water supply, and flood hazards), 
multiple policy institutions (e.g. conserving water resources, hazard mitigation planning, 
and regional transportation planning) and multiple actors (e.g. private and public 
organizations or individual at local, state or national levels) (Lubell, 2013). The policy 
system can be defined at any geographical scale but there is the need to account for cross-
scale interaction (ibid). This proposed dissertation considers the urban watershed scale as 
its policy system.   
A policy institution is constituted of formal rules and informal norms at the meso-
level that determine the patterning of interactions among policy actors within the urban 
policy system (Lubell, 2013; Lubell, Robins, & Wang, 2014). At the policy institution 
level, policy actors collectively decide to operationalize macro-level/constitutional rules to 
govern micro-level or operational rules (policy issues) such as water supply, water 
pollution, traffic congestion, etc. (Lubell, 2013; E. Ostrom, 1990). Policy actors, such as 
 7 
 
individuals or organizations, have a variety of interest or stake (e.g. appropriation and 
political interests) in the decisions made at the policy institution level (Lubell, 2013; Lubell 
et al., 2014). Therefore, they interact with other policy actors as they participate in a policy 
institution to gain information, credibility, and political influence (Berardo & Scholz, 
2010) as well as gain legitimacy, social acceptance, and improve social status (Edelman, 
1985; Long, 1958). The participation of policy actors in a policy institution implies that 
they are “playing a policy game” (Lubell, 2013, p. 540). Hence, the urban commons as an 
ecology of games simply considers the interactions of multiple games—e.g. banking, 
government/politics, etc.—and actors within the urban commons, where each game is 
structured by rules and strategies, all producing an unintended but functional system for 
the urban ecology.  
Polycentricity is a key feature of the ecology of games framework (Lubell, 2013; 
Lubell et al., 2014). Polycentric governance refers to a self-governing system constituted 
by “(1) many autonomous units formally independent of one another, (2) choosing to act 
in ways that take into account of others, and (3) through processes of cooperation, 
competition, conflict, and conflict resolution” (V. Ostrom, 1994a). Lubell (2013, p. 538) 
argues that the ecology of games could be looked at as “a theory[emphasis in original] of 
polycentric governance that extends E. Ostrom’s (1991, 2007) Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework[emphasis in original].” In using the ecology of games 
framework to study the governance of the San Francisco Bay (SF Bay) water resources, 
Lubell et al. (2014, p. 5), concludes that the S.F. Bay is “appearing polycentric.” This 
conclusion gives room to further interrogate issues such as 1) the form and constituents of 
governing system that ‘appears’ to be polycentric, and  2) the analytical and/or policy 
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relevance (if any) in characterizing a governing system as appearing polycentric. The 
former issue is both empirical and methodological in nature. The latter questions the extent 
to which polycentric governance could be generalized as a key institutional prescription to 
govern and promote resilient social-ecological systems (see Chaffin, Gosnell, & Cosens, 
2014; Cosens & Williams, 2012; Folke, 2007; Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005). 
This dissertation wrestles with these two and other issues. 
 
1.3 Significance of Research 
This dissertation offers theoretical and methodological contributions to the on-
going discourse on collaborative policy networks in governing social-ecological systems. 
Theoretically, Lubell et al. (2014) and Bodin and Crona (2009) note that there is no 
consensus on what types of network structures and social-ecological conditions affect 
governing arrangements in different contexts. Specifically, despite frequent citation to this 
fact, the role of polycentricity in ensuring effective governance of coupled social and 
ecological systems (e.g. the urban water commons) is under-theorized within the ecology 
of games framework. This dissertation conjoins multiple theoretical lenses to 
(re)conceptualize and develop a novel analytical framework to think about and analyze 
how polycentricity shapes network structures (e.g. interorganizational collaboration) in 
urban watershed governance.  
Beyond theory, the paper also makes methodological contributions, especially in 
response to the call of moving beyond the normative and descriptive focus of polycentrism 
(e.g. Green, 2007; Lubell, 2013). This is achieved through 1) the use of social network 
theory and analysis to methodologically engage polycentricity in urban water governance 
from a novel analytical perspective, and 2) the conjoining of multiple hypotheses to test 
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how different factors (e.g. bridging and bonding social capitals, social-ecological risks, and 
polycentricity) shape interorganizational collaboration within the urban ecology of water 
policy games. The latter contribution, in other words, offers a “supersynthesis” (Cairney, 
2013, p. 2) or a multi-theoretic lens in studying complexity in governing social-ecological 
systems (Lubell, 2013; Edella Schlager, 2007).  
In addition to the novel ways of thinking about and methodologically engaging 
polycentric governance within the ecology of games framework, the use of the Middle Rio 
Grande (MRG) urban watershed as proofs of concept can help policy makers, practitioners 
and scholars in the following ways. Specifically, the analyses and narratives presented in 
this dissertation can help local policy makers within the MRG to understand how the 
pattern of interorganizational collaboration within this urban watershed could potentially 
reveal 1) the level of trust organizations have for each other, 2) the specific organizations 
that could help foster greater collaboration, enhance information dissemination, and also 
help resolve conflicts between organizations, and 3) the extent to which the MRG could be 
effectively governed if organizations reach out to strategic partners (i.e. reaching out to 
different types of organizations operating at different governing scales). Again, the analysis 
and narratives embodied in the proofs of concept could also allow scholars and policy 
makers to replicate this study in other contexts (e.g. the use of different geographic 
locations and/or the use of different social-ecological systems such as forest resource 





1.4 Outline of Chapters 
The dissertation is presented in five cohesive chapters including both introduction 
and conclusion chapters. The introduction chapter serves as the roadmap by providing the 
context and thematically-linked research questions that animates this dissertation.  
The second chapter develops a theoretical framework of polycentric water 
governance by explicating its key tenets. This chapter offers a synthesized 
conceptualization of polycentricity in the areas of political economics, planning, and 
social-ecological networks. It puts into conversation three theoretical paradigms to 
excavate the conceptual pillars to study the polycentricity of urban water governance in the 
United States. These paradigms are the polycentric governance literature, the PUR concept 
championed by European urban planning scholars through projects like the POLYNET, 
and the social-ecological network analysis (SENA) framework. This synthesis is 
crystallized into five rules to study the polycentricity of coupled social-ecological systems 
such as urban water resources. Although the chapter restricts itself to water governance in 
the U.S., its embodied ideas could be translated to other social-ecological systems.  
The third chapter uses these key tenets to develop both theoretical and empirical 
models of polycentric water governance. This chapter uses the five rules in chapter 2 to 
develop both theoretical and empirical models to study the polycentricity of urban water 
governance. It uses the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) urban watershed in New Mexico, USA, 
as a case study. Four indices are developed to measure the level of political, market, 
nonprofit, and overall polycentricity in governing this urban water commons. The findings 
indicate that the governance of the MRG urban watershed is a predominantly monocentric 
governing system with elements of polycentricity. These findings also suggest that 
 11 
 
polycentric water governance could also primarily be about the politics of power and 
resource distribution, the reconfigurations of actors’ positionalities as they align 
themselves and their interests strategically. This raises both empirical and conceptual 
concerns as to the role of polycentric governance in actors’ strategic access to power and 
resources in governing the urban water commons.  
The fourth chapter uses the overall index to model the role of polycentricity in 
governing the urban water commons. This chapter provides a means to address the 
concerns raised in the third chapter: the role of polycentric governance in actors’ strategic 
access to power and resources in governing the urban water commons. It conceptualizes 
the governance of the MRG urban water commons as a constellation of policy actors and 
policy institutions, constituting a polycentric ecology of water policy games.  The 
exponential random graph models (ERGMs) is used to explain inter-actor (organizational) 
collaborations within the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) urban water commons. The chapter 
finds that a polycentric ecology of urban water policy games implies two non-mutually-
exclusive conditions. Firstly, there is a core-periphery (centralized) collaborative policy 
network segmented into a chain of smaller cohesive (decentralized) subgroup areas. This 
is referred to in the chapter as the Lubell-Robins-Wang polycentric hypothesis. Secondly, 
policy actors make strategic decisions to connect with other policy actors within different 
sectors and at different governing scales. Policy-wise, the findings suggest that traditional 
hierarchical institutional structures can resolve problems in governing the urban water 
commons, if policy actors across multiple governing scales and sectors collaborate.   
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The conclusion chapter provides summary and synthesis of the chapters by 













CHAPTER II: (RE) MAPPING POLYCENTRICITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
SPATIALITY, AND NETWORK OF POLYCENTRIC WATER GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Polycentrism is treated as a governance or spatial concept—polycentric governance 
(from a political economy standpoint) or polycentric urban regions (from an urban/spatial 
planning standpoint). Polycentric governance or a “polycentric political system” implies 
the existence of multiple decision-making centers that are formally autonomous of each 
other and operate under certain sets of rules (Aligica & Tarko, 2012; McGinnis & Ostrom, 
2012; E. Ostrom, 2010a; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]; Polanyi, 1951). The concept of 
polycentric urban region (PUR) considers a network of functionally interconnected 
settlements (Burger & Meijers, 2012; Green, 2007; Hall & Pain, 2006b; Vasanen, 2012). 
The underlying similarity between polycentric governance and PUR lies in the fact that 
scholars seek to interrogate, both conceptually and empirically, the logic behind and the 
implications of the network of multiple equipotent focal points (i.e. multiple decision-
making centers or multiple urban centers).
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This chapter provides a synthesized conceptualization of polycentric governance in 
watershed governance. It puts into conversation three theoretical paradigms to excavate the 
conceptual pillars of polycentric governance. These paradigms are represented in the 
polycentric governance literature mostly by the Bloomington School of Political Economy 
(Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, and their associates), the PUR concept championed currently 
by European urban planning scholars through projects like the POLYNET (Peter Hall and 
Kathy Pain and their associates), and  the social-ecological network analysis (SENA) 
framework (Bergsten, Galafassi, & Bodin, 2014; Bodin & Tengö, 2012; Rathwell & 
Peterson, 2012; Sayles, 2015; Schoon, Baggio, Salau, & Janssen, 2014). This synthesis is 
crystallized into five rules upon which robust methodological engagement and empirical 
testing of polycentric water governance could be pursued in future research. Although this 
chapter restricts itself to water governance, its embodied ideas could be translated to other 
coupled social and ecological systems.  
The chapter is structured into four main sections not including the introduction. The 
first section provides a brief literature context of water governance within the United States 
(U.S.). The second section offers both historical and theoretical overview of polycentrism 
by drawing on the work of Polanyi (1951) and the Bloomington School—the Polanyi-
Bloomington School. The third section maps out the conceptual pillars of polycentricity in 
governing social-ecological systems like the urban water commons. First, two rules are 
developed by dissecting and integrating the key ideas embodied in the literature on 
polycentric governance by the Polanyi-Bloomington School and the PUR literature. 
Second, these rules are built upon by developing three additional rules based on the central 
ideas in the SENA literature. The fourth section synthesizes these five rules into a 
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conceptual map of polycentric water governance. Policy network and social network 
scholars in general will find that this conceptual mapping easily lends itself to different 
methodological approaches like social network analysis. The chapter closes with some 
observations on operationalizing the rules for methodological analysis. 
2.2 Governing the Urban Water Commons in the United States 
Over 2000 watersheds in the contiguous United States are located within or 
experience the effects (e.g. urban runoff) of urban areas. The urban watershed is treated 
here as the big container constituted by many “commons” such as the “water commons.” 
Platt (2006, p. 29) defines urban watersheds in the U.S. as the  “…drainage units entirely 
or substantially within metropolitan regions, not major rivers that flow through or past 
cities like the Hudson at New York or the Mississippi at St. Louis and New Orleans”. These 
urban lands generally make up about 3 percent (61million acres) of the total U.S. land area 
(Nickerson, Ebel, Borchers, & Carriazo 2011). Denser urban regions in the east have more 
intensified urban uses (see Figure 2.1 below). The commons idea is used narrowly here to 
refer to the establishment of collective property claims over certain resources within the 
urban (e.g. land, water, etc.) through their sustained use and appropriation (Blomley, 2008; 
Gillespie, 2016).6The urban water commons as used in this paper helps to properly convey 
the specificity of the resource in the urban watershed being studied, the multiplicity of 
                                                          
6 Eizenberg notes the limitation of the contemporary use of the word commons because existing commons 
are only “live relics of the ideal of the commons; they are never complete and perfect and may even have 
components that contradict the ideal type’ (Eizenberg, 2012, p. 765). 
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collective property claims that are often made over this resource, and the scale dilemma 
associated with this urban resource.  I will discuss the scale dilemma later in this paper.  
Figure 2.1: Urban Watersheds in the United States 
Water governance generally refers to the various actors and systems (politico-
economic and administrative systems) in place to regulate the use and management of 
water resources (Baumgartner & Pahl-Wostl, 2013; Rogers & Hall, 2003). This definition 
is situated within the broader environmental governance definition, which looks at the 
formal and informal rules and practices guiding actors’ use of social-ecological systems 
(Chaffin et al., 2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). The governance of water resources and other 
social-ecological systems is based upon theories of collective action (Rogers, MacDonnell, 
& Lydon, 2009). Water, as a “fugitive resource”—its supply engenders natural monopolies 
and its use also generates to externalities (Rogers et al., 2009, p. 225)—requires institutions 
capable of 1) minimizing transaction costs among actors, and 2) effective monitoring and 
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enforcement of common rules to punish defectors and free-riders (Schneider et al., 2003). 
The creation of institutions capable of addressing these issues is increasingly needed as the 
mode of water governance keeps shifting in the U.S. and in other countries. In the U.S., 
water governance has shifted from strong centralized bureaucratic control in the 1960s and 
1970s to decentralization and privatization in the 1980s and 1990s to the currently network 
governance and community involvement (Pahl-Wostl & Knieper, 2014). 
There are variously constructed institutional prescriptions in governing social-
ecological systems such as the urban water commons. Reviewing the literature on water 
governance and adaptive (co-) management, Huitema et al. (2009) presents four 
institutional prescriptions—polycentric governance, public participation, experimentation, 
and bioregional approach (see also Pahl-Wostl, Holtz, Kastens, & Knieper, 2010). 
Participation, seen either narrowly as ‘stakeholder participation’ or broadly as ‘public 
participation’ simply refers to when the public or stakeholders are willing and able (e.g. 
have the desired participation channels) to make inputs in decisions (DeCaro & Stokes, 
2013; Huitema et al., 2009; Mostert, 2003; Reed, 2008). Experimentation in governance, 
as a critique of the ‘rational planning model’ (see Lindblom, 1959; van Gunsteren, 1976), 
privileges incremental institutional arrangements or “piecemeal engineering” (Popper, 
1985[1944], p. 309) based upon experiential or trial and error learning (Collingridge, 1992; 
Huitema et al., 2009). The bioregional approach supports the creation of “unitary”, 
“strong”, or higher-level (centralized authority) institutional arrangement at the river basin 
level (Dinar et al., 2005; Mitchell, 1990; E. Schlager & Blomquist, 2000, pp. 3-4). I will 
discuss polycentric governance in detail in later sections of the paper. 
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The above four institutional prescriptions are not mutually exclusive; they overlap, 
support, and/or constrain each other (Huitema et al., 2009). Specifically, as an umbrella 
institutional arrangement, polycentric governance, discussed by resilience and adaptive 
governance scholars, recognizes the mutually constitutive nature of all four intuitional 
prescriptions (Chaffin et al., 2014; Cosens & Williams, 2012; Folke, 2007; Folke et al., 
2005). For instance, public participation is key in developing a polycentric governance 
system for social-ecological systems (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2008; Folke et al., 2005; 
Lundqvist, 2004); the nesting of multiple centers of power supports institutional diversity 
and redundancy in power relations, which are needed characteristics for an adaptive 
governance system to still function in times of crises or disturbances (Chaffin et al., 2014). 
More importantly, the above institutional prescriptions are generally in response to 
the limits of the economic theory of politics (Rogers et al., 2009). The economic theory of 
politics was first critiqued by Downs (1957), which later became the bedrock in developing 
what became known as the ‘rational choice’ or ‘public choice’ governance model (see 
Brennan & Buchanan, 1984; Keating, 1995). Drawing on works like Dahl and Lindblom 
(1953), Downs (1957) constructs a politico-economic model of governance whereby 
citizens and local governments respond efficiently (not rationally as used by economists) 
to the “exigencies of life in an imperfectly informed world” (Downs, 1957, p. 149). There 
is also the ‘polis model’ by Stone (2002), which draws on Maass (1951) to explore the 
nexus between group (public interest) and atomized (self-interest) political mobilizations. 
Finally, there is also polycentric governance model, the focus of this paper and other works 
on governing water resources (e.g. Dietz et al., 2008; E. Ostrom, 1990), which draws on 
Polanyi (1951).  
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While normative claims have been made about the public choice model (e.g. 
Brennan & Buchanan, 1984; Buchanan, 1979), and the polis model (e.g. Boland & 
Baumann, 2009; Skutsch, Vickers, Georgiadou, & McCall, 2011), Huitema et al. (2009) 
note that we still cannot make normative claims about the polycentric governance model. 
The definition and conceptualization of polycentricity seem nebulous (Davoudi, 2007; 
Green, 2007); hence, its robust methodological engagement and empirical testing are also 
constrained. The remaining sections of the paper provides a foundation for 
epistemological/methodological approach to polycentrism by weaving together different 
perspectives on polycentricity to 1) synthesize the current understanding, 2) use this 
synthesis to excavate the conceptual pillars of polycentricity in the form of rules, and 3) 
conceptually map polycentricity for future methodological interrogation.   
2.3 The Political Economy of Polycentric Governance: A Brief 
Historical-Theoretical Context 
The literature on polycentric governance or what V. Ostrom (2008b) refers to as 
the “compound republic” problematizes state-market and public-private goods 
dichotomies. Samuelson (1954) argues for an optimal institutional form to distribute public 
and private goods. Public goods are nonexludable (no one can be exempted from enjoying 
them) and nonrivalrous (a person using it does not prevent another from using it). Hence, 
these goods are best provided by the state to minimize externalities. Private goods are the 
opposite of public goods—excludable and rivalrous—hence, the market is hypothetically 
the best institutional arrangement for providing these goods.  Ostrom (2010) notes that this 
dichotomy and the resultant institutional arrangements (state and market) support the 
arguments that 1) a hierarchical government or the Leviathan is needed to ensure that self-
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seeking individuals contribute to the efficient supply of public goods such as security 
(Ostrom, 2010, citing Hobbes, 1960[1651]; Wilson, 1885), and 2) there is efficiency and 
less chaos when a metropolis, for instance, is governed by a single rather than multiple 
governmental units (Ostrom, 2010, citing Friesema, 1966; Gulick, 1957). We will refer to 
this state-market, hierarchical government argument as the monocentric government 
argument (MGA).  
 Scholars (e.g. see Williamson, 1975, 1986) exposed the analytical flaws within the 
public-private and state-market dichotomies including the logic that hierarchical and fewer 
number of governmental institutions offers the optimum institutional form. We will sketch 
the flaws in the MGA by focusing on what should be the optimum scale of producing urban 
public goods and services. This begins with the logic of the reformers, who in the 1960s 
posited that there were many governments but not enough government, leading to overlap 
and duplication of jurisdictional functions (Aligica & Boettke, 2009; McGinnis, 1999; E. 
Ostrom, 2000; V. Ostrom & Ostrom, 1965). The multiplicity of political units in the 
metropolis, or what Lind (1997, p. 7) refers to as “horde of Lilliputian governments,” 
structured metropolitan governance into an “organized chaos” or a “crazy-quilt pattern” 
(V. Ostrom et al., 1961, p. 831). Scholars of the Bloomington School, however, argued that 
metropolitan governance comprised of multiple agencies (government, quasi-government, 
and private organizations) at multiple governing scales offers the optimum scale in the 
efficient production of different urban public goods and services (McGinnis, 1999; V. 
Ostrom et al., 1961).  
The Bloomington School’s position against the MGA was rooted in two arguments. 
First, the Bloomington School marshalled an intellectual argument against monocentric 
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government by building on Polanyi’s seminal manuscript, “The Logic of Liberty” (1951). 
Polanyi (1951) centrally argued that progress in any organizational system (e.g. the 
scientific community) is achieved when the system has a polycentric organization. 
Polycentric organization allows the existence of multiple opinions, supports individual 
freedom, and allows people to make their personal contributions, and promotes progress 
through a trial-and-error evolutionary process as individuals interact freely (Aligica & 
Tarko, 2012; Polanyi, 1951). Here, Polanyi’s (1951) polycentrism argument draws closer 
to Hayek’s (1945) logic that the Pareto optimum of goods and services cannot be achieved 
through a monocentric authority—neither command-control-strategy nor market 
strategy—because there is imperfect information in both the command-and-control and 
market systems (see also Downs, 1957).  
The second argument also deals with the multidimensional nature of goods and 
services. The monocentric metropolitan government could provide a bundle of Pareto 
optimum goods and services if all goods and services could be boxed into the Samuelson 
(1954) public-private goods dichotomy. Buchanan (1965), however, introduced a third 
kind of good—club goods—engendered as a result of private associations (club) providing 
nonrivalrous goods and services for their members only (nonrivlarous but excludable goods 
and services). E. Ostrom (1991) added a fourth type of good—common-pool resources 
(e.g. forest systems and urban water resources)—which represent those goods and services 
which are rivalrous (subtractable) but difficult to exclude (see E. Ostrom, 1972 for detailed 
discussion on goods, (dis)economies  of scale, and metropolitan governance). These four 
different types of goods pose a governance riddle: what governance/institutional 
arrangements suit the management of goods and services which are neither purely 
 22 
 
excludable nor purely subtractable? Polycentric governance is an attempt to unravel this 
riddle. 
Through intergovernmental arrangements (e.g. collaborative and participatory 
decision making), a polycentric governance system emerges as a constellation of multiple 
decision-making centers coordinated by multiple and different decision-making powers to 
induce efficiency and self-correcting mechanisms (V. Ostrom & Ostrom, 1965).  McGinnis 
(2015, p. 5) looks at polycentric governance as consisting of (1) multiple decision-making 
centers with overlapping jurisdictions, (2) formal and informal collaborations through the 
interactions of these decision-making centers, and (3) generation of a social order from 
these interactions, which is capable of ensuring democratic self-governance and capturing 
efficiencies at all aggregation scales. It is not self-evident that large scale government 
(monocentric government system) leads to economies of scale, and multiple governments 
within the metropolis are less efficient and chaotic. The evidence rather suggests that, 
“polycentric arrangements, generally, outperformed cities that had only one or two large 
departments” (McGinnis, 1999; E. Ostrom, 2000; E. Ostrom, Parks, & Whitaker, 1978; V. 
Ostrom, 1999[1972], p. 148). Further, the evidence suggests, noted  V. Ostrom 
(1999[1972]) and McGinnis (1999, p. 52), that a predominantly polycentric governance 
system may contain elements of monocentric government and vice versa; that is, 
polycentric and monocentric government systems are two sides of the same coin. Again, 
the evidence also suggests that there is a “systemic logic” to polycentric governance in that 
“islands of polycentric order” (e.g. market polycentrism, and judicial polycentrism) 
influence each other (Aligica & Tarko, 2012, p. 247; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]).  
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The governance of social-ecological systems (such as water resources) fits the 
polycentric governance arrangement rather than the state-market institutional arrangement 
(E. Ostrom, 2010a). Social-ecological systems are governed by diverse and often multi-
scalar institutional arrangements (market, government, quasi-market, and quasi-
governmental institutions) designed by policy actors who face complex motivational and 
payoff structures (see Folke et al., 2005; Folke, Pritchard, Berkes, Colding, & Svedin, 
2007). But what does it mean specifically to describe water governance as polycentric? 
The next sections of the paper wrestle with this question.  
2.4 Conceptualizing the Political Economy of Polycentric Governance 
The framework in Figure 2.2 below illustrates key points in the discussion above. 
The first part of the framework, the four quadrants, is adapted from Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 
(2014). In these four quadrants, we see the state-market dichotomy represented as either 
being monocentric or decentralized. This first quadrant presents an often misunderstood 
logic in the Polanyi-Bloomington School argument: polycentricity is not the antithesis of 
monocentricity. The solution to the multiple decentralized governments or firms, as argued 
by the MGA scholars (e.g. Christenson & Sachs, 1980; Horan & Taylor, 1977; Jones, 
1942), was to propose an institutional arrangement—monocentricity—diametrically 
opposed to a decentralized arrangement. This ‘black or white’ logic is what the Polanyi-
Bloomington School rejects. As shown in the second part of the framework, the matrix 
presents the inherent complexity in the thinking of the Polanyi-Bloomington School 
scholars. If the answer to the complicated governance riddle earlier posed does not lie in a 
binary oppositional logic, then, we could combine and experiment with multiple 
institutional arrangements.  
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The four by four matrix section of the framework presents an alternative way of 
thinking about the four quadrants. There are four institutional arrangements expected: 1) a 
purely monocentric or decentralized institutional arrangement (diametrically opposed 
institutional arrangements); 2) an institutional arrangement involving organizations at 
different governing scales (mix of decentralized and centralized); 3) an institutional 
arrangement involving organizations within different sectors (mix of public and private); 
and 4) an institutional arrangement involving organizations at different governing scales 
and within different sectors (mix of decentralized-centralized and public-private). The 
fourth outcome, which involves different governing scales (monocentric and decentralized) 
and within different sectors (public and private), as noted by McGinnis (1999) and Aligica 
and Boettke (2009), is what the paper terms as the zone of pure polycentrism. The second 
and third institutional outcomes are not purely polycentric but contain elements of 
polycentrism—mix of governing scales or mix of sectors (partial polycentrism).  
In the matrix, there is only a 25% chance of having these diametrically opposed 
institutions (the first expected institutional arrangement) compared to the 75% chance of 
having combinations of institutional arrangements that have elements of both monocentric 
and decentralized institutional arrangements. This, perhaps, is a more accurate 
representation of how societies in the U.S. especially are governed: governance is not 
purely monocentric or decentralized but a melting pot of both. The probability of having 
partial polycentrism (second and third outcomes) is 50% and the probability of having a 
purely polycentric system (the fourth outcome) is also 25%. In other words, conceptually, 
the probability of having a purely polycentric or diametrically opposed (monocentric or 
decentralized) institutional arrangements are lesser than having a system containing 
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elements of both. This could help illustrate the point that the governance of U.S. societies 
is neither purely polycentric nor purely monocentric or decentralized. It is more of an 
imperfect (partial) polycentric governance system; the nesting of multiple institutional 
arrangements that sometimes looks like a largely monocentric system within a polycentric 
system and vice versa (see V. Ostrom (1999[1972]) and McGinnis (1999, p. 52). We will 
expand on some of these key points in the next section of the paper as we excavate the 
conceptual pillars (or the rules) of polycentricity in water governance or other social-
ecological systems. 
2.5 The Conceptual Pillars of Polycentric Water Governance 
2.5.1 The Political Economy and Spatiality of Polycentrism: European Spatial 
Planning School Meets Bloomington School 
Some scholars have explored the concept of polycentric development or PUR or 
polynucleated urban landscape (e.g. Batty, 2001b; Davoudi, 2003; Green, 2007; Hall & 
Pain, 2006b; Parr, 2004). The interest in polycentric development was influenced by the 
increasing number of city centers (e.g. the city-suburb spatial forms), which shifted the 
conversation from the monocentric city model or the core-periphery model to the emerging 
PUR (Copus, 2001; Green, 2007). The history of modern planning, argued by Green 
(2007), shows that the discourse on polycentric urban region in planning could be traced 
back to scholars like Ebenezer Howard (1898), Patrick Geddes (1968[1915]), Lewis 
Mumford (1938), and Hall (1984). PUR has been used to describe places like the Greater 
London and south-east England in the United Kingdom (Geddes, 1915/1968, pp. 27–28), 
Radburn, Hamburg, and Köln in Germany (Mumford, 1938, p. 490), and Randstad in 
Holland (Hall, 1984; Meijers, 2005).  
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The link between polycentric governance and polycentric urban region can be seen 
in terms of two interrelated issues—the normative versus analytical dimensions of 
polycentrism, and the functional versus morphological dimensions of polycentrism. First, 
both the polycentric governance and the polycentric urban region scholars have advocated 
making polycentricity analytically relevant. This requires separating the normative and 
analytical aspects of polycentrism.  Green (2007, p. 2079) argued that polycentrism, for 
some, has become an “ism” that must be achieved. The need to explore the analytical 
relevance of polycentrism is not to negate the use of polycentrism in the normative sense. 
However, because of definitional ambiguity of polycentricity some scholars have argued 
that more empirical tests are needed (Lieberman, 2011); hence, normative evaluations of 
polycentricity become tenuous at best (Bailey & Turok, 2001; Mostert, 2012; Turok, 2005). 
In other words, we must explore the analytical relevance of polycentricity through robust 
empirical tests and use such findings to inform normative claims about polycentricity.  
Second, exploring the analytical side of polycentrism means that one needs to deal 
with the morphological and functional aspects of polycentrism. Through projects like the 
EU-funded POLYNET (Hall & Pain, 2006b), scholars interested in PUR have expanded 
the literature to include the morphological and functional aspects of polycentrism, 
developing and offering robust empirical tests of polycentricity as a spatial concept. We 
will focus on and adapt some of the works by these polycentric urban region scholars, 
specifically the works of Green (2007), Burgess et al. (2012), and Vasanen (2012), as a 
means to develop and empirically test polycentric governance.  
Green (2007), based on what he terms “functional polycentricity,” attempts to 
define and measure polycentricity based on its morphological and functional aspects. The 
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morphological aspect of polycentrism refers to the multiplicity of adjacent centers (urban 
centers) within a given territorial space (Burger & Meijers, 2012; Green, 2007; Vasanen, 
2012). In terms of polycentric governance, we can look at morphological polycentric 
governance as also the plurality of adjacent decision-making policy actors within given 
territorial and decision-making spaces at the constitutional, policy, and/or operational 
levels. For instance, in urban water governance, we are interested in the various adjacent 
policy actors within 1) the policy space of urban water governance (i.e. the number of 
actors involved in urban water decisions), and 2) the specific urban territorial space where 
these decisions are made (e.g. the Middle Rio Grande urban watershed, New Mexico 
(MRG)). Following the lead of Green (2007), from this morphological conception of 
polycentrism, we could state, as the first rule, that for polycentric governance to exist: 
Rule 1: There must be more than one policy actor within specified policy and 
territorial spaces.  
Morphological polycentrism, however, only captures the existence of adjacent 
policy actors without capturing the functional relationships (e.g. policy actors’ 
collaboration or partnership with each other) (Burger & Meijers, 2012). The existence of 
adjacent nodes (e.g. urban centers or policy actors) within specified policy and territorial 
spaces, whereby these nodes are relatively equal in their absolute importance, only captures 
the topography (location) of polycentrism (Green, 2007, p. 2083). But in polycentric 
governance discourse especially, the adjacency of nodes (policy actors) is not only 
topographical but also functional/topological (Green, 2007). For instance, in studying 
urban water governance in the MRG, we may identify policy actors like the City of Santa 
Fe and the Valencia Soil and Water Conservation District (VSWCD) as adjacent nodes 
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within the specified policy space of urban water governance and the specified territorial 
space of the MRG. However, the City of Santa Fe and the VSWCD are also adjacent 
(located topographically) because of they have a functional (e.g. collaboration or 
partnership) relationship. Hence, morphological polycentricity becomes: 1) a 
representation of an implicit functional relationships among policy actors; and 2) a 
necessary but insufficient condition for polycentric governance. This way, polycentric is 
separated from terms like ‘multicentric’ or ‘multinuclear’ (Burger & Meijers, 2012, p. 
1133). Again, following the lead of Green (2007), we could state that for polycentric 
governance to exist: 
Rule 2: There must be functional linkages between policy actors (e.g. collaboration 
or partnerships) so that there is no polycentric governance in the absence of such a 
functional linkage.  
Taken together, Rules 1 and 2 explain the point that functional polycentrism builds on 
morphological polycentrism to account for the absence of absolute importance of certain 
specific nodes in a polycentric system (governance or urban regions) (Burger & Meijers, 
2012). In effect, functional polycentric governance (Rule 2) encapsulates morphological 
polycentric governance (Rule 1); henceforth, functional polycentric governance and 





2.5.2 The Network of Polycentrism: SENA Meets European Spatial Planning School 
and Bloomington School 
In polycentric governance, we are interested in a policy actor’s degree of 
connectedness to the system. In other words, since polycentrism is a scalable concept, our 
basic unit of analysis is the policy actor, but not the entire region occupied by multiple 
policy actors. We can then scale a policy actor’s degree of connectedness (polycentric 
index) to the sub-group (e.g. market polycentrism or political polycentrism) and to the 
overall group (combination of all sub-group polycentrisms). This approach adopts a 
methodological logic akin to the bottom-up approach of analyzing urban systems 
(Coombes, Green, & Openshaw, 1986; Davoudi, 2008). Vasanen (2012) used such a 
logical approach to compute the connectivity of individual centers to the whole urban 
system. Privileging the policy actor, not the entire region occupied by multiple policy 
actors, is based on Polanyi’s (1951) argument for  the connectivity and autonomy of 
individuals within a polycentric organization (see also V. Ostrom, 2002, p. 440). In other 
words, a policy actor’s polycentric index represents an individual’s maximum level of 
connectedness within a polycentric organization without compromising the policy actor’s 
autonomy. We will explore what this further by drawing on the literature on social-
ecological network analysis (SENA) framework, complemented by the work of McGinnis 
(2005, 2015) and Hooghe and Marks (2001; 2003).  
SENA helps to address the central features of polycentric governance—multi-scale 
and multi-type/multi-sector (McGinnis, 2005)—by connecting social and ecological units 
in governing natural resources (Bodin & Crona, 2009; Sayles, 2015). SENA has been used, 
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both conceptually and empirically, to investigate scale or social-ecological mismatch7 
within multi-ecological units (Bergsten et al., 2014; Rathwell & Peterson, 2012; Sayles, 
2015). We can think of social-ecological scale-mismatch as the misfits or incongruences 
between governing boundaries and natural resources systems as a result of the multiplicity 
of institutional arrangements often involved in governing coupled social-ecological 
systems like urban water resources (Crowder et al., 2006; Folke et al., 2007; Sayles, 2015). 
Examining social-ecological mismatch within the Puget Sound watershed, WA, U.S.A, 
Sayles (2015) built a SENA framework for multi-level governance.  
Two node types are needed to build a SENA framework—social nodes, and 
ecological nodes. Social nodes generally refer to the policy actors (individuals or 
institutions) involved in governing the natural resource system. In a multi-level governance 
framework, these social nodes are classified into local nodes and higher-scale nodes 
(regional nodes). These regional nodes operate at the regional, state and federal/national 
policy levels. Although these higher order nodes implicitly imply jurisdictional hierarchy 
in the social-ecological system (Ernstson, Barthel, Andersson, & Borgström, 2010; 
Rathwell & Peterson, 2012), the multi-level SENA framework defines these nodes based 
on the spatial extent within which these organizations work (Sayles, 2015). The work of 
these higher order nodes spatially overlaps the ecological nodes. For example, the U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) may work 
respectively in the Valencia Soil and Water Conservation District (VSWCD) and the Santa 
Fe Soil and Water Conservation District (SSWCD) in New Mexico.  But the work of the 
USBR and the USACE are not spatially restricted to only these two soil and water 
                                                          
7 Scale-mismatch and socio-ecological scale mismatch are used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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conservation districts, hence, we designate these two social nodes as regional nodes not 
based on hierarchy but based on the spatial extent of their operation. In simple terms, 
regional social nodes are connected to more than one ecological node while local social 
nodes are connected to only one ecological node. 
This distinction between hierarchy and spatial extent is very important in 
polycentric governance because it clarified the debate between McGinnis (2015) and  
Hooghe and Marks (2001; 2003). Hooghe and Marks (2001, 2003) define two institutional 
arrangements—Type I and Type II institutional arrangements. Type I institutions offer a 
neat model of federalism where multipurpose governance units are arranged in a hierarchy 
with non-overlapping jurisdictions. Type II consists of an institutional arrangement of 
special purpose governance agencies that are cross-jurisdiction (e.g. water districts). These 
cross-jurisdictional multi-purpose governance units are established to “fill in the gaps” that 
often open up in the Type I institutional arrangement (McGinnis, 2015, p. 7). Although it 
could be analytically useful to categorize institutions as being  either Type I or Type II 
institution, McGinnis (2005) averred that these categories ignore a system-level 
(polycentric) analysis of institutional arrangements (V. Ostrom, 2002); and therefore, fail 
to capture how policy networks develop based on multiple contacts among different 
organizations at different governing scales and within different sectors. So far, our 
discussion of social and ecological nodes under SENA has touched on the multiple 
governing scale aspect of polycentrism without addressing the multiple sectors aspect. 
Later, we will modify the SENA framework to include the different sectors aspect of 
polycentrism.    
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The ecological nodes are both spatial and aspatial jurisdictional designation—that 
is, in coupled social-ecological systems like urban water resources, an ecological boundary 
should consider both the natural watershed and the administrative boundaries. However, 
previous studies have only looked at the spatial jurisdictional designation (i.e. natural 
watershed or forest boundary) of these ecological nodes. For instance, Sayles (2015) 
defined the ecological nodes based on the small watershed boundaries in the Puget Sound 
watershed—these boundaries are classified as the HUC 10 boundary level by the U.S. 
Geological Survey. Again, Bodin and Tengö (2012) define the ecological nodes based on 
the boundary of forest patches within a rural village in Madagascar. In the U.S. context, 
however, the Soil and Water Conservation District (SWCD) is one such ecological unit 
that aligns the natural watershed and administrative boundaries. Therefore, the SWCDs 
will serve as the ecological nodes in this discussion. 
The two node types—social and ecological—serve as the basis to assess whether 
policy actors (local or regional nodes) classified under the various ecological units have 
ties or edges that help to address the social-ecological scale-mismatch within the system. 
These ties or “scale bridging edges” are classified into three types—local-local edges 
(between two local nodes within different ecological units), local-regional edges (between 
a local node and a regional node), and regional-regional edges (between two regional 
nodes) (Sayles, 2015). These three edges show the extent to which different social nodes 
bridge the social-ecological scale-mismatch within a polycentric governance system. 
Multiple configurations of these scale-mismatch bridging edges/ties (SMBEs) could exist 
within a given network system, which could point to the existence of polycentrism within 
monocentricity and vice versa (McGinnis, 1999; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]). For instance, a 
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network with many local-local, local-regional, and regional-regional edges indicates that 
social-ecological scale-mismatch is occurring at both local and regional levels even while 
these levels are connected. This configuration implies a high-degree of functional 
polycentric governance, but it does not preclude some degree of—albeit minimal—
monocentric configurations within the network (e.g. instances where some local and/or 
regional social nodes are isolated or have few edges). We will therefore formulate another 
rule for functional polycentric governance: 
Rule 3: In a functional polycentric governance system, there must exist at least two 
node types—social nodes (local and regional) situated within at least two ecological 
nodes/units—to allow for at least three basic node-edge configurations to bridge 
scale-mismatch—local-local, local-regional, and regional-regional.  
It should be noted that the local-local edge between two local social nodes within 
the same ecological unit is not a scale bridging edge under the SENA framework; hence, it 
is excluded from the analysis (see also Sayles, 2015). This has two interrelated 
implications: 1) In a SENA framework with 8 social nodes for instance, the maximum 
edges possible within the network are less than that expected in a regular network with 
eight nodes; and 2) social nodes do not have to be connected to everyone to have a perfectly 
connected system because local-local edges within the same ecological unit are excluded 
in the computation. These implications, especially the second, offers a methodological 
avenue to illustrate Polanyi’s (1951) argument that some level of individual autonomy is 
needed in polycentrism (see also V. Ostrom, 2002).  
For instance, assume an eight-node network—4 local social nodes (SALN1, SANL2, 
SBNL3, SBNL4), 2 regional social nodes (R1 and R2) and 2 ecological units (A and B). 
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Regional nodes R1 and R2 have cross-jurisdictional working operations within ecological 
units A and B. Local social nodes SALN1 and SANL2 are functionally connected to (operate 
within) ecological unit A, and local social nodes SBNL3 and SBNL4 operate within ecological 
unit B. Local social node SALN1 has a perfect functional connection within this network if 
it is connected to SANL2, SBNL3, and SBNL4 (perfect local-local SMBEs) and R1 and R2 
(perfect local-regional scale-mismatch bridging ties). In methodological terms, if we 
conceptualize autonomy narrowly as a local social node’s ability to function while not 
being connected to one of the possible connections within the system, then, A1 is not 
autonomous in the above instance. However, as explained earlier, the SENA framework 
excludes edges between social nodes within the same ecological units (i.e. an edge between 
SANL1, and SANL2 in this example). Hence, SANL2 could still have a perfect connection within 
the network (connecting to SBNL3, SBNL4, R1, and R2) while having some level of autonomy 
(not having a connection to SANL2). We will capture this autonomy argument in this 
additional rule: 
Rule 4: In a functional polycentric governance system with perfect functional 
connections, the maximum edges possible to bridge scale-mismatch within the 
network are less than what’s expected in a regular network (Expected SMBEs <
n2−n
2
, where n = social nodes) to allow local social nodes to have some degree of 
autonomy. 
We will further modify the SENA framework to operationalize functional 
polycentric governance by incorporating into it the multi-sector nature of polycentric 
governance highlighted by McGinnis (2005) and the Polanyi-Bloomington School in 
general. In functional polycentric governance, we are interested in both the multi-scaling 
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and the multi-sectoral nature of functional connections among social nodes (McGinnis, 
2005). The SENA framework categorizes these social nodes based on scale (local-regional) 
but it does not categorize them according to their sectors of operations—e.g. political, 
market, and nonprofit social nodes. The relevance of this sector-based categorization lies 
in the argument that polycentric governance is about multiple organizations operating 
within different sectors (Aligica & Tarko, 2012; McGinnis, 2005; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]). 
These multiple sectors constitute themselves as “islands of polycentric order” (e.g. market 
and political polycentric orders) that nonetheless influence each other (Aligica & Tarko, 
2012, p. 247). For instance, we can think of market polycentrism or polycentric order 
within the SENA framework as constituted by political social nodes with SMBEs within 
different ecological units. We could represent the multi-sector argument of polycentrism 
as our final rule: 
Rule 5: In a functional polycentric governance system, social nodes constitute more 
than one island of polycentric order within which social nodes form SMBEs. 
2.6 Mapping the Multidimensionality of Polycentric Water Governance 
Figure 2.3 below presents a conceptual mapping of polycentric water governance 
by integrating the five rules earlier discussed. It essentially incorporates the multi-sector 
and multi-scale argument of polycentrism into the SENA framework. We will increase our 
hypothetical eight-node network example above to a network of 13 nodes to explain the 
five rules discussed above. Here, the local (SALN1, SANL2, SANL3, SANL4, SBLN1, SBNL2, SBNL3, 
SBNL4) and regional (R1, R2, and R3) social nodes are categorized according to their 
organizational types such as political nodes, market (business) nodes, and nonprofit nodes. 
We will restrict ourselves to these three sectors in this paper. These social nodes and their 
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functional linkages shown in Figure 2.3 below satisfy the first and second rules: there must 
exist multiple policy actors with functional linkages between them within specified policy 
and territorial spaces.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Conceptual Mapping of Functional Polycentric Governance 
 
The third rule is also satisfied because these social nodes are functionally connected 
to (operate within) two ecological units—ecological units A and B. This allows for the 
three node-edge configurations— local-local, local-regional, and regional-regional—
stipulated in the third rule. The fourth rule states that the maximum edges expected in a 
perfectly connected (perfect polycentric governance system) is less than what’s expected 
in a regular network. This is also satisfied because there are no edges between two local 
social nodes within the same ecological unit (e.g. SALN1 and SANL2 or SBLN1 and SBNL2).  
Finally, categorizing the social nodes as political, economic/market, and nonprofit nodes 
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helps to constitute these social nodes into three islands of polycentric order (political, 
economic/market, and nonprofit polycentric orders).  
2.7 Conclusion 
This paper sought to excavate the conceptual pillars to study the polycentricity of 
the urban water commons. A brief context of water governance in the U.S. is first provided. 
The context of U.S. water governance portrays the involvement of multiple political-
economic and administrative systems constituted by overlapping institutional 
arrangements—polycentric governance, public participation, experimentation, and 
bioregional approach (Huitema et al., 2009). The paper then zooms in on what constitutes 
the polycentricity of governing social-ecological systems (e.g. urban water resources) since 
polycentrism is regarded in the literature as a key governing characteristic of coupled 
social-ecological systems (Berardo & Lubell, 2016; Dietz et al., 2008; Folke et al., 2005; 
Lundqvist, 2004). Here, the historical-theoretical contours of polycentric governance is 
mapped to present the debate between the MGA and Bloomington School scholars on what 
is an optimum institutional arrangement. From this historical-theoretical landscape, the 
paper surmises that 1) polycentricity is not the antithesis of monocentricity, 2) 
polycentricity involves the co-constitution of actors at multiple governing scales within 
multiple sectors, and 3) conceptually, the probability of having a purely polycentric or 
diametrically opposed (monocentric or decentralized) institutional arrangements are lesser 
than having a system containing elements of both. 
The paper expands on the above three points to delineate five conceptual pillars, in 
the form of rules, constituting polycentric water governance in the U.S. These include 1) 
existence of multiple policy actors, 2) presence of functional linkages between these policy 
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actors, 3) policy actors comprise of social nodes embedded within ecological nodes, 4) 
social nodes are relatively autonomous of each other—they form ties which bridge 
governing scales but the maximum SMBEs for each social node is less than what’s 
expected in a regular network, and 5) social nodes operate within multiple sectors—islands 
of polycentric order. The paper then integrates these conceptual pillars (rules) to develop a 
conceptual mapping of polycentric water governance. Although this conceptually mapping 
is restricted to the polycentricity of urban water governance in the U.S., its embodied ideas 
could be translated to other coupled social and ecological systems.  
Two issues remain in moving forward with the ideas presented in this paper. The 
first relates to how to operationalize methodologically these rules (conceptual mapping) 
for an empirical testing of polycentric governance. Tools and methods in social network 
analysis could offer promising approaches to operationalize the rules methodologically. 
The second issue, both conceptual and empirical in nature, relates to how the 
operationalized rules could be used to 1) analyze whether polycentric governance is a cause 
or effect of other prevailing social-ecological factors, and 2) make normative claims about 
polycentrism. This paper synthesizes the literature on polycentrism and delineates the 
conceptual foundations to guide future studies in wrestling with the above and other 
interesting issues in the polycentricity of governing urban water resources in the U.S. 
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CHAPTER III: THE POLYCENTRICITY OF URBAN WATERSHED 
GOVERNANCE: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
3.1 Introduction 
Polycentric governance is a key institutional prescription to govern and promote 
resilient social-ecological systems (Chaffin et al., 2014; Cosens & Williams, 2012; Folke, 
2007; Folke et al., 2005). This paper brings together the theoretical efforts of polycentric 
governance (PG) in the political science area (e.g. Aligica & Tarko, 2012; V. Ostrom, 
1999[1972]) and polycentric urban region (PUR) in the planning area (e.g. Davoudi, 2003, 
2007), and develops a methodology to test empirically the polycentricity of urban 
watershed governance. Polycentric governance or “polycentric political system” implies 
the existence of multiple decision-making centers that are formally autonomous of each 
other and operate under certain sets of rules (Aligica & Tarko, 2012; McGinnis & Ostrom, 
2012; E. Ostrom, 2010a; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]). Polycentric urban region considers a 
spatial network of functionally interconnected settlements (Burger & Meijers, 2012; Green, 
2007; Hall & Pain, 2006b; Vasanen, 2012). 
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The empirical testing of polycentrism (the idea underlying both PG and PUR) has 
advanced at different paces within the literature. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s especially, 
scholars from the Bloomington School of Political Economy (Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, 
and their associates) provided rigorous empirical support for PG. For instance, numerous 
studies on public service delivery (e.g. police protection services) in U.S. urban and rural 
areas support the argument that a mix of institutions (small- and medium-sized), through 
intergovernmental arrangements, are effective in public service delivery (McGinnis, 1999; 
E. Ostrom et al., 1978; V. Ostrom, 2008a, 2008b).  
Since the early 2000s, spatial planners and analysts have increasingly studied the 
interconnectedness of European cities using innovative and theoretically-grounded 
analytical methods such as agent-based models and social network theory and analysis 
(Batty, 2001a, 2001b; Governa & Salone, 2005; Meijers, 2005; Parr, 2004). Particularly, 
the EU-funded POLYNET project (Hall & Pain, 2006b), marked a significant juncture in 
the spatial analysis of polycentrism. From this project, Green’s (2007) seminal paper on 
‘Functional Polycentricity’ borrowed from the literature on social network theory and 
analysis (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) to develop a theoretically-grounded method in 
analyzing networked European cities (i.e. polycentric urban regions). Burger and Meijers 
(2012) and Vasanen (2012) have also explored the social network theory and analysis 
dimension to spatial polycentricity.  
This chapter is built upon the existing literature and explores a social network 
theory and analysis dimension of PG. The paper studies the polycentricity of urban water 
governance using the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) urban watershed in New Mexico, USA, 
as the case study. Specifically, it develops three sub-indices and an overall index of 
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polycentricity to: 1) determine whether the governance of the MRG could be characterized 
as a polycentric governance system; 2) examine whether actors operating within different 
sectors (e.g. political, economic/market, and nonprofit sectors)  in a polycentric governance 
system—what Aligica and Tarko (2012) refer to as “islands of polycentric orders”—do or 
do not influence each other, and 3) establish the relationships between the polycentric 
indices and other network graph statistics and discuss what these relationships mean to the 
study of polycentric water governance.  
3.2 Mapping the Theoretical Landscape of Polycentricity in Urban 
Water Governance 
The ‘theory of polycentrism’ has been explicated extensively in the literature (e.g. 
Aligica & Tarko, 2012; McGinnis, 1999, 2015; E. Ostrom, 2010a; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]). 
This section will not recapitulate the discussions and contestations in the literature. The 
goal here is briefly excavate the theoretical pillars to guide the methodological enactment 
of polycentrism in governing urban watersheds. In other words, what does it mean, 
theoretically and empirically, to describe the governance of social-ecological systems as 
polycentric?  
3.2.1 Polycentricity as the Multiplicity and Functional Connectivity of Actors  
Polycentricity implies the collective functioning of multiple, linked equipotent 
centers. To avoid cooperation paralysis, as Polanyi (1951) argued, the Pareto optimum 
outcome is achieved through a trial-and-error evolutionary process as multiple autonomous 
decision-making centers (e.g. individuals and organizations) interact freely (see also E. 
Ostrom, 2005). Without going in-depth into the philosophical exegesis of polycentrism 
(see in-depth discussion in works like Aligica, 2014; Aligica & Tarko, 2012), the 
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discussion here points two foundational premises about polycentricity: 1) free, 
autonomous, and/ or ‘equally powerful’ entities (individuals, organizations/firms, spatial 
centers); and 2) the interactions or linkages among these entities. These premises 
foreground the theoretical foundation upon which polycentricity is discussed in this paper. 
Polycentricity emerges from interactions. To borrow a key logical construct of 
relational/post-structural geographies, e.g. actor network theory and assemblage theory 
(Cresswell, 2013; Farías & Bender, 2009; McFarlane, 2011; Murdoch, 2006), 
polycentricity could be seen as an emerging relational space shaped constantly by the 
multiplicity of actors’ interactions. To put it differently, the discourse on polycentricity can 
only begin upon the premise that an observed group of actors are linked/connected. For 
instance, in spatial planning, interactions between autonomous territorialities (e.g. cities, 
regions or countries) could be in the form of commuting patterns or commodity flows 
between places. In governance terms, we could think of interactions between organizations 
or actors to comprise of interorganizational exchanges in service delivery or support. 
Consequently, Green (2007, p. 2101) in his seminal paper proposed a “formal definition” 
of polycentricity as a collection of “functionally connected and balanced” cities, firms, or 
people (see also Hall & Pain, 2006a; Hall & Pain, 2006b).  
The recognition of the functional connections between autonomous entities forces 
us to consider the topography and topology of polycentricity. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
difference (see an alternative illustration in Green, 2007). Topography considers the 
physical shape formed by considering where the autonomous are located (see the left side 
of Figure 3.1). Topology considers the connectedness of these autonomous entities 
regardless of their physical location (see the right side of Figure 3.1). From the figure, 
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actors A, B, and C hypothetically represent the various government and nonprofit agencies 
working in location X. On the left side of the figure, these actors have been arranged 
according to where their offices are located. This is a topographical representation. On the 
right side of the figure, these actors have been represented to show who they are connected 
to (e.g. who they collaborate with in terms of technical assistance, funding, etc). They have 
been topologically represented because who they are connected to, not where they are 
located, is relevant here. 
This difference between topology and topography is important for polycentric 
governance because the relationship between actors—e.g. federal agencies like the United 
Stated Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and local governments—is constructed based 
on the exchanges (e.g. technical and financial) between them and is not about where these 
agencies are physically located. Therefore, the mere presence, concentration and proximity 
of multiple governmental and non-governmental agencies within a particular geographic 
space do not necessarily constitute polycentric governance. In other words polycentricity 








3.2.2 Polycentricity as the Mix of Actor Types (Sectors) and Governing Scales 
It is a necessary but insufficient condition to define polycentricity in terms of 
multiple actors and the functional connections between them. McGinnis (2005, p. 8) assert 
that “a polycentric system of governance is multi-level, multi-type, and multi-sector in 
scope” (see also E. Ostrom, 2010a, 2010b). To empirically explore this, we need to know 
the types of actors and the governing scale at which they operate, and the heterogeneity of 
an actor’s connections (i.e. an actor’s connectedness to other types of actors who operate 
at different governing scales).  
First, the theoretical pillar of multiplicity of different types of actors relates to the 
argument that polycentricity is shaped by multiple “pulsating polycentric domains” 
(Aligica, 2014; Aligica & Tarko, 2012, p. 247). Polycentric domain/sector or “island of 
polycentric order” (Aligica & Tarko, 2012, p. 247) could simply been seen as the policy or 
decision arena in economy, law, or politics, within which multiple centers of decision 
making interact through competition and/or cooperation (Aligica, 2014; Aligica & Tarko, 
2012; McGinnis, 2015). The interactions within and between these multiple domains 
(re)generate and transform the entire system to create what V. Ostrom (1999[1972], p. 57) 
refers to as the “polycentric order.” A polycentric order is thus defined as “where many 
elements are capable of making mutual adjustments for ordering their relationships with 
one another within a general system of rules where each element acts with independence 
of other elements” (V. Ostrom, 1999[1972], p. 57). Therefore, we could conceptualize 
polycentric governance as involving different types of actors (e.g. political, market, 
nonprofit, judicial) whose activities creates and recreates polycentric order within and 
between these polycentric domains—e.g. political polycentric order, market polycentric 
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order, and judicial polycentric order. The polycentric order within these polycentric 
domains shapes and is also shaped by the polycentric order of the entire governance system 
(Aligica, 2014, p. 51; McGinnis, 2015; Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012; V. Ostrom, 
1999[1972]). 
Second, the theoretical pillar of governing scales speaks to Ostrom’s (1990, p. 90; 
2005, 2010a) “nested enterprises” and its relationship to the theory of collective action. 
Folke et al. (2005, p. 449) note that polycentric governance involves “nested quasi-
autonomous decision-making units operating at multiple scales.” Polycentric governance 
as a nesting of enterprises is when governance activities are organized in multiple layers 
involving local and higher organizational levels with clearly demarcated jurisdictional 
boundaries (Folke et al., 2005; Lundqvist, 2004; E. Ostrom, 1990). The theory of collective 
action (Olson, 1965) or what E. Ostrom (1990) refers to as the Olson’s Dilemma was a 
challenge of the group theory hypothesis. The group theory hypothesis argued that 
individual with a common interest will voluntarily act to pursue such an interest (Bentley, 
1949; Truman, 1958). Olson (1965, p. 2), however, argued that rational, self-interested 
individuals will free-ride and not act to achieve their common interest unless they are 
coerced to do so. This logic of collective action has often driven scholars to offer two 
oppositional institutional prescriptions—the coercive state (Leviathan) approach by 
proponents like Ophuls (1973) and Hardin (1978) vs. the market (privatization) approach 
by adherents like Demsetz (1983) and Welch (1983). 
The nesting of enterprises as the alternative to these two oppositional institutional 
prescriptions is based on two critiques. In the case of environmental problems, the 
empirical support for collective action theory shows mixed results regarding the free-rider 
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problem—some cases support the free-riding hypothesis and other cases do not (Agrawal, 
2002; Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010; Edella Schlager, Blomquist, & Tang, 1994). E. 
Ostrom (2010b) calls for an update of the collective action theory by revising the ‘rational 
theory’ of human behavior (Camerer, 2003; Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011) to incorporate 
different social-ecological contexts that shape individuals’ norms and values of trust and 
reciprocity (Poteete et al., 2010; Rothstein, 2005). Individuals do not possess perfect 
information and are ‘intendedly but boundedly’ rational actors who make and correct their 
decisions based on experience and experimentation, and the continuous gathering and 
analysis of information (Cox, Friedman, & Gjerstad, 2007; E. Ostrom, 1998; Edella 
Schlager & Blomquist, 1996; Simon, 1955). Next, E. Ostrom (1990, 2000) debunked these 
oppositional institutional prescriptions by arguing that scholars 1) understimated the ability 
of individuals to self-organize and self-govern, and 2) assumed that collective action 
dilemma could be resolved through panacea—one-size-fit-all institutional arrangement. In 
reality, we see a more complex nesting of enterprises—“polycentric public economies” (E. 
Ostrom, 2000, p. 33)—whereby large-, medium-, and small-scale institutional 
arrangements are necessary components of an effective governing system (E. Ostrom, 
2010b, p. 552).  
The complex nesting of enterprises constitutes an institutional mix of what 
Schneider et al. (2003) refer to as the “vertical-boundary spanning” (centralized) and 
“horizontal-boundary spanning” (decentralized) governing structures.8 These boundary 
spanning institutional arrangements reveal cross-jurisdictional mechanisms within a 
polycentric governance system: 1) instances where actors operate (have offices and/or are 
                                                          
8 The vertical-boundary spanning  also refers to command-and-control or adversarial institutional 
arrangement (Heclo, 1978; John, 1994; Weber, 1998). 
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solely responsible for the execution of a project) within multiple local politico-juridical or 
boundaries, and/or 2) instances where actors are connected to other actors in different 
localities. In both instances, we see a complex matrix of relationships involving nonlocal 
(e.g. state or federal) and local actors (vertical-boundary spanning), and local-local and 
nonlocal-nonlocal actors (see also Pahl-Wostl & Knieper, 2014). Polycentric governance 
as an integrative matrix of institutional relationships is sustainable because these 
institutions offer complementary support: 1) vertical-boundary spanning (hierarchical) 
institutional arrangement provides less costly avenue for monitoring collective agreements 
and conflict resolution among actors especially in large social-ecological systems, and 2) 
horizontal-boundary spanning (decentralized) institutional arrangement ensures self-
governance, collective-choice arrangements, and congruence between appropriation and 
provision rules especially in small- and medium-sized social-ecological systems 
(McGinnis, 2005; E. Ostrom, 1990, 2005, 2010a).  
The complementary support provided by the mixed of institutional arrangement in 
a polycentric governance system is also explored by Sarker (2013) using a concept he refers 
to as the “state-reinforced self-governance” (see also DeCaro, Chaffin, Schlager, 
Garmestani, & Ruhl, forthcoming). The next sub-section of the paper uses the social-
ecological network approach (SENA) framework to synthesize the above-discussed 
theoretical pillars of polycentrism multiplicity of actors and functional connectivity, and 
mix of actor types (sector) and governing scales. This synthesis will be used to engage a 
methodological approach in studying the polycentricity of urban water governance by 




3.3 (Re) Casting the Theoretical Pillars of Polycentric Governance 
within the SENA Framework: Synthesis and Methodological 
Approach 
3.3.1 Synthesizes of the Theoretical Pillars through the SENA Framework  
The social-ecological network analysis (SENA) framework examines spatial 
mismatch or spatial fit in environmental governance—the incongruences between 
governance boundaries and natural resource systems (Cumming, Bodin, Ernstson, & 
Elmqvist, 2010; Cumming, Cumming, & Redman, 2006; Gunderson & Holling, 2002; 
Sayles, 2015). The misalignment between the scale of ecological processes and the scale 
of institutions contributes to the mismanagement of natural resources and also affects the 
resilience of both human and ecological systems (Bodin, Crona, Thyresson, Golz, & 
Tengö, 2014; Cumming et al., 2006; Folke et al., 2007). Cumming et al. (2006) have 
identified three forms of scale mismatches: spatial mismatch (misalignment between the 
spatial scales of management and ecosystem processes); temporal mismatch (misalignment 
between the temporal scales of management and ecosystem processes); and functional 
mismatch (misalignment between the functions of management such as consumption and 
the functions of ecosystems).  
This paper considers spatial scale mismatch. Henceforth the use of scale mismatch 
refers to spatial mismatch. Spatial mismatch manifests in ways such as when upstream and 
downstream water management and land use control cannot be achieved due to the absence 
of a large governance boundary to manage the entire watershed, and, conversely, when the 
governance boundary of a watershed is too large and hence disrupts local self-governance, 
collective-choice arrangements, and congruence between appropriation and provision rules 
(Sabatier, Foucht, Lubell, Trachtenberg, & M. Matlock, 2005; Sayles, 2015). These two 
 50 
 
oppositional manifestations highlight the polycentric governance dilemma: how are 
institutional enterprises nested through vertical- and horizontal-boundary spanning 
connections between actors to bridge scale mismatches (i.e. realign the boundaries of 
governance and ecological processes) (see also Folke et al., 2005; Guerrero, McAllister, 
Corcoran, & Wilson, 2013).  
This section of the paper adapts the SENA framework to weave a conceptual 
framework that integrates the existing discussions of polycentrism that involves multiple 
autonomous actors with functional connections, operating at different governing levels and 
within different sectors.  The SENA framework analyzes the structural patterns formed in 
environmental governance processes as a result of the connection between social and 
ecological units (Bodin & Crona, 2009; Cumming et al., 2010). A key structural pattern 
analyzed in this paper is the emergence of polycentric governance in urban watersheds. 
Scale mismatch bridging edges (SMBEs), an analytical tool within the SENA framework 
(Bodin & Tengö, 2012; Sayles, 2015), becomes useful to analyze the structural pattern of 
polycentric urban water governance. 
Scale mismatch bridging edges considers the multiplicity of connections between 
governance and ecology. An analysis of SMBEs begins with the basic analytical units 
within a SENA framework—social nodes (actors) and ecological nodes (the geo-political 
boundaries of the ecological process) (Bodin & Tengö, 2012). Social nodes are the policy 
actors (individuals or institutions) involved in governing ecological systems. As shown in 
Figure 3.2, in a multi-level governance framework, these social nodes are classified into 
local nodes and regional nodes. Regional nodes operate at the regional, state and 
federal/national policy levels and are defined based on the spatial extent within which these 
 51 
 
organizations operate (Sayles, 2015). Based on the Figure 2, local (SALN1, SANL2, SANL3, 
SANL4, SBLN1, SBNL2, SBNL3, SBNL4) and regional (R1, R2, and R3) social nodes are categorized 
according to their organizational types such as political nodes, market (business) nodes, 
and nonprofit nodes. These classified social nodes and their functional linkages respond 
toward the earlier discussions about theoretical pillars of polycentric governance: 
multiplicity of actors and functional connectivity, and mix of actor types (sector) and 
governing scales.  
 
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Mapping of Polycentric Governance  
 
The ecological nodes, shown as ecological units A and B in Figure 2, consider both 
the ecosystem boundary (i.e. the watershed boundary in the case of this paper) and the 
administrative boundaries. The Soil and Water Conservation District (SWCD) in the 
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United States is one such ecological unit that aligns the natural watershed and 
administrative boundaries.  
The two node types—social and ecological—form three node-edge 
configurations— local-local, local-regional (we can also have regional-local based on the 
direction of the connection), and regional-regional. These node-edge configurations or 
scale mismatch bridging edges (SMBEs) show the extent to which different social nodes 
connect to different actors within different localities and at different governing scales. The 
SENA framework has two key analytical advantages for analyzing the polycentricity of a 
governing system.  
Firstly, node-edge connection between two local social nodes within the same 
ecological unit is excluded from the analysis because it is not considered a SMBE (see also 
Sayles, 2015). This means that the maximum edges needed by a social node to connect 
bridge scale mismatches (perfect scale-bridging connections) within a network are less than 
what’s expected in a regular network (Expected SMBEs <
n2−n
2
, where n =
social nodes). To put it simply, actors do not have to be connected to everyone to have a 
perfectly connected system (i.e. network where actors have all the expected SMBEs). This 
offers a methodological avenue to illustrate, albeit narrow and simplistic, Polanyi’s (1951) 
argument that some level of individual autonomy is needed in polycentrism. For instance, 
in Figure 2, for local social node SALN1 to have a perfect functional connection within this 
network it needs to form SMBEs to SBNL1, SBNL2, SBNL3, and SBNL4 (perfect local-local 
SMBEs) and R1 and R2 (perfect local-regional scale mismatch  bridging ties). Hence, SANL1 
could still have a perfect connection within the network (connecting to actors in ecological 
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unit B and regional actors) while having some level of autonomy in this system (not having 
a connection to actors in ecological unit A). 
Second, the SENA framework helps us determine an actor’s connectivity 
(aggregate SMBEs) within the islands of polycentric order (political, market and nonprofit) 
and within the entire governance system. In other words, since polycentrism is a scalable 
concept, our basic unit of analysis is the actor. We can measure an actor’s degree of 
connectedness by induces (e.g. political polycentric index, market polycentric index, 
nonprofit polycentric index, and overall functional polycentric governance index index). 
This approach adopts a methodological logic akin to the bottom-up approach of analyzing 
urban systems (Coombes et al., 1986; Davoudi, 2008). Vasanen (2012) used such a logic 
approach to compute the connectivity of individual centers to the whole urban system. The 
conceptual basis for privileging actor level over a system level functional polycentric 
governance index is based on Polanyi’s (1951) argument that a polycentric organization 
implies the connectivity of individuals without comprising their autonomy (see also V. 
Ostrom, 2002, p. 440). In other words, an actor’s overall polycentric index (functional 
polycentric governance index), represents its maximum level of connectedness within a 
polycentric organization without compromising its autonomy. The next section builds on 
this idea to develop an actor’s polycentric indices—political polycentric index (PPI), 
market polycentric index (MI), nonprofit polycentric index (NPI), an overall functional 




3.3.2 Constructing Polycentric Governance Index 
We will construct three sector specific indices and an overall index of polycentricity 
(FPGI). We have to first identify a network or a graph of multiple nodes connected to each 
other. These nodes are the policy actors involved in governing an urban watershed. These 
nodes can be classified into two groups—ecological nodes and social nodes. The ecological 
nodes are those policy actors representing the geo-political boundaries of the urban 
watershed, such as soil and water conservation districts (SWCDs). The social nodes are the 
other policy actors in the network. Next, we group the social nodes connected to only one 
ecological node as local social nodes, and those connected to multiple ecological nodes 
regional social nodes. For example, a nonprofit organization located within a SWCD is a 
local social node, and the EPA is a regional social node. Local social nodes are further 
grouped according to their corresponding ecological units. For example, local 1 refers to 
all social nodes connected to ecological unit 1. All the regional social nodes belong to the 
same category. We further classify social nodes according to their type of institution—
political, market, or nonprofit–for both local and regional nodes. The above steps are 
summarized in the following representations:  
i:          Index of local social nodes; 
j:          Index of regional social nodes; and  
k: Index of sector (=1, for political sector; =2, for market sector; =3, for nonprofit 
sector).  
After identifying the network and classifying the social (actors) and ecological 
nodes, we can define scale mismatch bridging edges (SMBEs) and use that to compute the 




𝑘:  Local-local type-k SMBE for the local social node i = The number of links between 
local social node i and all the local type-k social nodes in the other ecological units;  
𝐿𝑅𝑃𝑖
𝑘:  Local-regional type-k SMBE for the local social node i = The number of links 
between each of the local social nodes and all the regional type-k social nodes;  
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑗
𝑘: Regional-regional type-k SMBE for the regional social node i =The number of links 
between regional node j and other regional type-k social nodes; and 
𝑅𝐿𝑃𝑗
𝑘: Regional-local type-k SMBE for regional social node i =The number of links 
between regional node j and other local type-k social nodes;  
With the above SMBEs defined, we calculate political, market, and nonprofit 
polycentric indices for a local social node i (𝑃𝐼𝑖
1, 𝑃𝐼𝑖
2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝐼𝑖








𝑘  and 𝐿𝑅𝑃𝑖
𝑘 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖
𝑘  and 𝐿𝑅𝑃𝑖








𝑘                             (2) 
We calculate the FPGI for a local social node i (𝐹𝑃𝐺𝐼𝑖) and for a regional social 
node j(𝐹𝑃𝐺𝐼𝑗) using equations 3 and 4 below:  
𝐹𝑃𝐺𝐼𝑖 =
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖
𝑘  and 𝐿𝑅𝑃𝑖
𝑘3
𝑘=1  
∑ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖
𝑘  and 𝐿𝑅𝑃𝑖
𝑘3
𝑘=1
                  (3) 
𝐹𝑃𝐺𝐼𝑗 =
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3.4 Case Study of the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) Urban Watershed, 
New Mexico 
We use the MRG urban watershed to test the proposed methodological approach of 
functional polycentric governance. The Middle Rio Grande (MRG) watershed or basin is 
located in central New Mexico (NM) and covers approximately 3,060 square miles. The 
MRG watershed is part of the Rio Grande River, which is over 1,900 miles long, and flows 
from the San Juan Mountains, near Creede, CO into the Gulf of Mexico. The Rio Grande 
River forms the border between Mexico and Texas, which makes it a “successive and 
contiguous” international and national watercourse (Benson, Llewellyn, Morrison, & 
Stone, 2014, p. 201). The MRG extends from the Cochiti Dam to the Elephant Butte 
Reservoir in central New Mexico (see Figure 3.3 below). It encompasses nine soil and 
watershed districts— Valencia SWCD, Ciudad SWCD, Socorro, SWCD, Santa Fe-
Pojoaque SWCD, Sierra SWCD, Coronado SWCD, Claunch-Pinto SWCD, Doña Ana 
SWCD, and Lava SWCD—all spanning seven main counties—Santa Fe, Sandoval, 
Bernalillo, Valencia, Socorro, Torrance, and Cibola. It is also home to six Native American 








Figure 3.3: The MRG Urban Watershed in Context 
The MRG urban watershed is ideal to study polycentric water governance. The 
MRG involves multiple inter-state compacts such as the: Animas-La Plata Project Compact 
(1968), Canadian River Compact (1950), Colorado River Compact (1922), Costilla Creek 
Compact (1946), La Plata River Compact (1925), Pecos River Compact (1948) Rio Grande 
Compact (1939), and the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (1949) (Buynak & 
Oglesby, 2014). Benson et al. (2014) note that the multi-jurisdictional nature of this water 
commons and the extensive amount of public lands in this area have led to the presence of 
many policy actors, especially federal and state government agencies, within the Rio 
Grande and its associated watersheds like the MRG. Table 3.1 presents some of the policy 
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actors and their interests/roles in the governance of the Rio Grande and its associated 
watersheds like the MRG). Some scholars have characterized this watershed as 
experiencing a “rigidity trap;” that is, these actors “become highly connected, self-
reinforcing, and inflexible” (Benson et al., 2014, p. 223; Carpenter & Brock, 2008). This 
is partly because of the high presence of multiple internal and external actors (e.g. federal 
and state actors) and legal agreements. This suggests hierarchy (monocentricity) in 
governing the MRG urban watershed. However, as  E. Ostrom (2000, 2010b) notes, 
monocentric governance does not negate the presence of polycentricity within a governign 
system. A predominantly polycentric governance system may contain elements of 
monocentric government and vice versa  (McGinnis, 1999, p. 52; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]). 
The methodological approach developed in this paper will empirically test whether the 
MRG has monocentric governing system with elements of polycentricity. 
Table 3.1: The Interests of some Federal, State, and Local Players in Governing the 
MRG 
Policy Actor Type  Interest/Responsibility 
The International 
Boundary and Water 
Commission 
International Interest in ensuring the implementation of the treaty 
between the United States and Mexico in the use of the Rio 
Grande 
US, Canada and Mexico National Interested in securing their water rights granted in the 
various compacts governing the Rio Grande 
States like Colorado, New 
Mexico, and Texas 
U.S. States Interested in securing their assigned apportionment of 
water from the Rio Grande 
U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) 
Federal Agency Interested in fulfilling its mandates related to flood control 
operations through projects like dam construction in the 
MRG (Abiquiu and Cochiti reservoirs) 
Bureau of Reclamation 
(USBOR) 
Federal Agency Interested in fulfilling its mandates related to operating the 
two water storage and delivery projects in the MRG (the 
Chama and El Vado Reservoir projects) 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service USFWS) 
Federal Agency Interested in the implementation and enforcement of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
U.S. Forest Service 
(USFS) 
Federal Agency Interested in managing most of the public lands in the 
upland forest areas upstream of the MRG 
Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(USBIA) 
Federal Agency Interested in ensuring that the pueblo communities within 
the MRG receive their allocation of water under the tribal 
water agreements 
NM Office of the State 
Engineer (NM OSE) 
State Agency Interested in administering water in accordance with the 
prior appropriation doctrine in New Mexico 
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Policy Actor Type  Interest/Responsibility 
New Mexico Inter-state 
Stream Commission (NM 
ISC) 
State Agency Interested in ensuring that New Mexico obliges with and 
obtains its rights under the various interstate compact 
agreements 
Cities, Counties,  and Soil 
and Water Conservation 
Districts (SWCDs) such as 
Albuquerque City, Santa 
Fe City, Rio Rancho City, 
Bernalillo County, 
Sandoval County, etc. 
City and county level 
political jurisdictions 
Interested in managing the recreational open-space along 
the riparian corridor (the Bosque) of the Rio Grande River  
as well as land use management decisions and impacts on 
water quality and quantity in MRG 
Albuquerque-Bernalillo 
County Water Utility 
Authority (ABCWUA) 
City and county level 
political jurisdictions 
Interested in drinking water projects in the MRG 





Interested in fulfilling its mandates of constructing dams 
and levees to drain the historic floodplain for agricultural 
use and to deliver water to the MRG district 




Interested in securing their “Prior and Paramount” rights to 
water 
Environmental Groups  National, State and 
local agencies 
Their interests and belief vary (e.g. from water resource 
protection to forest conservation). However, all these 
interests broadly seek for the conservation of the 
environmental commons in the MRG. 
Source: Compiled from Benson et al. (2014) 
 
3.5 Data and Analysis 
The study employed the archival snowball network sampling approach in gathering 
network data (Burt, 1975, 1983; Carley & Hummon, 1993; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Over a period of six months, data on policy actors (i.e. organizations) involved in water 
and environmental conservation activities in the MRG as well as their collaborators within 
were collected using the snowball network sampling method. The snowball network 
sample is comprised of nominated zones—e.g. first-order zone, second-order zone, etc. 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Figure 3.4 below illustrates how the archival-based snowball 
network sampling was employed in this research.  
In the first step, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) databases on 
urban watershed collaborative partnerships served as the initial point to locate policy actors 
within the study area—the MRG urban watershed. For the second step, the websites of, 
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and archival documents (e.g. academic documents, action/strategic plan and memorandum 
of understandings) related to each organization (identified in step one) were examined to 
record the characteristics of these organizations—e.g. whether they are a nonprofit or 
government (political) organization—and their past and present project/policy/funding 
collaborators. Steps three and four entailed the same process utilized in step two to identify 













Figure 3.4: Framework for the Archival Snowball Network Sampling Used 
 
In all, more than 700 websites and archival documents (e.g. online newspaper 
articles, academic documents, government documents, annual reports, grant databases, 
budget documents, memorandum of understandings, and action/strategic plans) were 
collected through this network snowball approach using google search and LexisNexis. 
However, the study limited itself to collaborations occurring within the past 10 years, 
which reduced the number of websites and archival documents analyzed to 473. 
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Collaboration tie/link between two actors (organizations) was measured as a non-
directional relationship (cannot distinguish relationship from A to B and vice-versa). Partly 
informed by Lubell’s (2004a) coding parameters, the presence of a collaborative tie 
between two actors (e.g. A and B) was determined as a yes (1) or no (0) if:  
1) A is a project partner (or listed as a partner) of B or vice versa; 
2) A provides financial assistance (listed as a financial donor, corporate sponsor, 
and/or grantor) to B or vice versa; 
3) A and B have joint implementation agreement (JIA) and/or memorandum of 
understanding (MOU); 
4) A and B share logistics and personnel (including volunteering); and 
5) A and B have a shared permitting or regulatory activities. 
The above listed were coded to analyze the websites and archival documents. The 
study adapted the coding scheme approach by Campbell, Quincy, Osserman, and Pedersen 
(2013) This coding scheme is designed to improve reliable coding of in-depth qualitative 
data (e.g. analyzing an entire government annual report) and also for single coder projects, 
especially when a single knowledgeable person in the subject matter is required to 
determine subtle meanings in the text being analyzed (ibid).  Reliability deals with this 
issues of stability (i.e. do codes change over time?), accuracy (i.e. were gold standard 
schemes used), and reproducibility or inter-coder reliability (i.e. will different coders code 
the data the same way?) (Krippendorff, 2004; Popping, 2010). The use of Lubell’s (2004a) 
coding parameters, with some few additional parameters, helped to ensure consistency in 
the coding (the stability issue), and also minimize inaccuracies in measuring a collaboration 
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tie. The few additional parameters were added based on the inputs and advice from the 
author’s research committee members.  
Multiple approaches were adopted to ensure the reliability of the data and the 
analysis conducted even though this was a single coder project and required a relatively 
simple coding approach to collect network data (i.e. absence or presence of a collaboration 
tie between two organizations if any of the above coding parameters were present). After 
developing the coding parameter, the author sampled 40 of the data records already 
obtained—this included 5 websites, 1 grant database, and the rest were online newspaper 
articles, academic papers and annual reports of some already identified organizations based 
on the first 1 outlined in Figure 3.4 above. The author solicited the assistance of a colleague 
to help assist in assessing the inter-coder reliability in analyzing the data (see also Campbell 
et al., 2013). Both the author and his colleague analyzed the data independently using the 
coding parameters.  
Two interrelated errors were seen by comparing the adjacency matrix (which actors 
have a collaboration tie between them) obtained by the author and his colleague. A total of 
21 actors were obtained in one matrix and 24 actors were obtained in the other. This 
evidently also affected the adjacency matrices obtained—a pair of actors had a missing 
collaboration tie in one matrix and not the other matrix. These errors were mainly the result 
of ambiguities in the organizational names (and sometimes acronyms) as well as duplicates 
in the list of organizations because some data records used a department or project to 
represent a larger organization while other data records used the name of the large 
organization. For example, sometimes Bosque del Apache National Wildlife Refuge and 
Friends of Bosque del Apache were used interchangeably even though the former is a 
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project by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the latter is a nonprofit group established 
to support the project.  
These errors were remedied by ensuring consistent use of organization names and 
acronyms. Again, even though the use of the NVivo qualitative data software made it easier 
to code and analyze the 40 sample of data records, it also made it easier to catch some of 
these and other potential errors. Hence, since the coding parameters were relatively simple 
and easy to use, and most of the data records involved looking at a specific part of an 
organization’s website (e.g. finding the “corporate sponsor” or “partners” section on the 
website), the author analyzed the data manually to help reduce the above mentioned and 
other potential errors that could have been missed by using NVivo.  
The data was prepared, analyzed (e.g. network clustering and centrality analysis, 
and bivariate and multivariate regression analysis) and presented using multiple software 
programs including R and its network analysis packages such as the sna and statnet suites 
in R (Butts, 2008; Handcock, Hunter, Butts, Goodreau, & Morris, 2003), and the Cytoscape 
software (Shannon et al., 2003). The preliminary analyses were compared with both 
published (some have been cited in the chapter) and unpublished scholarly works to have 
a general sense of potential inaccuracies. These preliminary analyses were also shared with 
a researcher who has studied this site to also determine potential inaccuracies. 
3.6 Results and Discussion 
The network data collected constitute political, market, and nonprofit actors or social nodes 
involved in governing the MRG urban watershed. Figure 3.5 presents the network graph 
of the MRG urban watershed governance. These are nine soil and water conservation 
districts (ecological units/nodes), 82 local social nodes (actors who operate within one 
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ecological unit), and 109 regional nodes (operate within more than one ecological unit). 
The dominance of regional nodes (57 percent of total social nodes) points to the 
multiplicity of multi-jurisdictional actors (e.g. federal government actors) within this urban 
watershed as noted by Benson et al. (2014). There are more nonprofit actors (54 percent) 
operating within this urban watershed, compared to 34 percent political actors and 12 
percent market/business actors. These imply that characterizing the governance of this 
watershed as polycentric largely depends on actors/social nodes possessing more local-
regional, regional-local, and regional-regional SMBEs connected to the nonprofit and 
political actors. Hence, the multiplicity of social nodes covering multiple ecological units 
alone does not make the governance of the MRG polycentric. We need to understand the 
























































3.6.1 Determining the Polycentricity of Governing the MRG 
 Table 3.2 below presents the descriptive statistics of the SMBEs of actors within 
the different sectors. Three findings are discussed from the descriptive statistics and 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 below to provide empirical support that the governance of the MRG 
urban watershed could be characterized as largely monocentric with some minimum level 
of polycentricity. Firstly, polycentric governance is a multi-scale issue (McGinnis, 2005; 
E. Ostrom, 2000; V. Ostrom et al., 1961). On the average, actors within the MRG have 
more SMBEs between local and regional actors (average of 3.1 for local-regional and 4.3 
for regional-local) and between regional actors (average of 2.3).  This is visually 
represented in Figure 3.6 below. This figure presents a two-set map of the SMBEs between 
local and local actors and local and regional actors (the local and regional actors combines 
both local-regional and regional-regional SMBEs). On the maps, regional actors are located 
outside (non-jurisdictionally bounded western part) of the nine ecological units because 
these actors operate in two or more ecological units.   
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics SMBEs of actors 







Polycentric Order Total (FPG) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Local-local 3.2 4.6 0.2 0.4 1.3 2.3 1.6 3.2 
Local-Regional 4.7 5.3 0.5 1.1 4 3.8 3.1 4.2 
Regional-Regional 3.8 4.8 0.2 1 2.8 4.7 2.3 4.2 
Regional-Local 7.0 6.8 1 1.3 4.8 6.4 4.3 6 




Figure 3.6: Density of SMBEs based on the governing scales of actors 
 The map on the left side of Figure 6 shows that the density (intensity) of local-local 
SMBEs is high for local 2, local 3, local 4, local 5, and local 6 actors. Most of these 
ecological units are within the densely populated urban centers in New Mexico (e.g. 
Albuquerque and Santa Fe). The MRG River also flows directly through most of these 
ecological units. This map, therefore, shows that local actors within these five ecological 
units are reaching out more to each other (high density SMBEs) in the governing of the 
MRG. The map on the right also shows that local 2 and regional actors are reaching out 
more to each other (high density SMBEs between these two actors).  The local 2 ecological 
unit is within Albuquerque, which is the most densely populated urban center in NM.  
 68 
 
Sayles (2015), using the SENA framework, opines that the absence (or the presence 
of a minimum number) of SMBEs between local and regional actors demonstrates that 
local and regional actors are disconnected. This means that to describe the governance of 
the MRG as polycentric, in addition to witnessing high density local-local SMBEs, there 
should also be no disconnection between the actors—that is, there should be observed 
density SMBEs between local and regional actors. From analyses and discussions above 
(see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.6 above) we see, albeit minimally, that 1) local actors within 
different ecological units are reaching out to each other, and 2) there is no disconnection 
between local and regional actors in governing the MRG.  
Polycentric governance is also a multi-sector issue (Aligica & Tarko, 2012; 
McGinnis, 2015; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]). We must consider the actors within these islands 
of polycentric order to identify the number of scale mismatch bridging connections formed 
between these actors and other actors within the network. Table 3.2 indicates more local-
regional and regional-regional SMBEs (average of 4.2 edges) within the political 
polycentric order than the nonprofit polycentric order (average of 3.9 edges). This is 
visually represented in Figure 3.7. There are high-density (red) and moderate-density 
(brown) lines in all the three maps but there are more of these lines in the first map (Political 
SMBEs). In other words, actors form more SMBEs with political actors than with nonprofit 
and market actors.  
Even though there are more nonprofit actors (54 percent) than political actors (34 
percent), there are more political SMBEs in governing the MRG urban watershed. This 
finding, perhaps, points to an inherent characteristic of polycentric governance that our 
methodology did not explicitly capture: the power and resource capability of actors (see 
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Bulkeley, 2005; Huitema et al., 2009; McGinnis, 2011). The designation of a political 
polycentric order was an implicit categorizing of actors with political and some resource 
capabilities; but it does not fully address the power and resource capability dimension of 
polycentric governance. Again, we see that high density SMBEs in all three maps are 
formed between local 2 and regional actors. As earlier noted, the local 2 ecological unit is 
very important within the MRG because it is located in the most populated urban center in 




Figure 3.7: Density of SMBEs based on the sectors and governing scales of actors 
 Finally, even though we see some traces of polycentrism—SMBEs across multiple 
governing scales and sectors—among actors, the MRG urban watershed governance could 
be characterized as minimally polycentric within a largely monocentric government 




system. Figure 3.8 shows that not all SMBEs are present within this policy network. On 
the average, only 15 percent, 4 percent, and 7 percent of the expected total scale mismatch 
bridging edges for the political (PPI), market (MI), and nonprofit (NPI) political orders 
respectively are present. This means that actors, on average, are exposed to only 15 percent 
political actors, 4 percent market actors, and 7 percent nonprofit actors working within 
different ecological units (soil and water conservation districts) and at different scales 
(regional scale).  
Figure 3.8: Total SMBEs and Average Polycentric Governance Indices 
 The three-set map shown in Figure 3.9 indicates the most polycentrically connected 
actors within the three islands of polycentric order. About 25 percent (47) actors have a 
PPI of 20 percent or more (see appendix 1 for these actors). In other words, these actors 
have SMBEs which connects them to 20 percent or more of the political actors within the 
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MRG. The number of actors having an NPI and MI is less. This brings to light the role of 
politics (power, resources, etc.) in the discourse around polycentric governance (Huitema 
et al., 2009; McGinnis, 2011). The polycentricity of urban water governance may above 
all be about the politics of resources and power distribution and asymmetries therein; and 
the resultant constant reconfigurations of actors’ positionalities as they align themselves 



































 The bivariate analysis of the PPI, MI, and NPI, presented in Figure 3.10 below also 
shows significant positive relationships (p values < 0.01). The coefficient of determination 
is high for MI and NPI (R2 of 0.5) and approximately 0.3 for both PPI-NPI and PPI-MI. 
This implies, for instance, that NPI explained about 50 percent of the variance in the MI. 
To put it differently, we can partly (50 percent) understand the pattern of actors’ SMBEs 
to market actors by studying the pattern of actors’ SMBEs to nonprofit actors. Since it is a 
bivariate analysis, the opposite explanation also holds. We can infer, albeit cautiously, that 
this provides an evidence to the argument that these islands of polycentric orders often 
influence each other in polycentric governance (Aligica & Tarko, 2012; McGinnis, 2015). 
Again, it should be noted that the coefficient of determination is comparatively lower when 
PPI is involved. This could indicate that connectedness of political actors is less influenced 
by the other two types actors (or islands of polycentric orders).  
 
 
Figure 3.10: Bivariate Analysis of the PPI, MI, and NPI Indices 
  
R2 = 0.486 R2 = 0.253 R2 = 0.246 
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 Since correlation does not necessary imply causation, the results here serve only as 
prima facie evidence of the possible reinforcements among these polycentric orders. Again 
the relationships between these indices (islands of polycentric order) could be nonlinear 
(contrary to what the bivariate analysis shows) and could also be mediated by multiple 
factors. Therefore, the nature and degree to which these different polycentric orders 
influence each other still require further empirical interrogation.   
 Based on the three indices (PPI, NPI, and MI), actors involved in governing the 
MRG urban watershed, on average, have a functional polycentric governance index of 0.1 
(see Figure 3.11 and appendix 2 for ranking of actors based on their FPGI). To put it 
differently, the functional connections formed by actors in governing the MRG urban 
watershed exposes them to only 10 percent (average) of all actors working within different 
sectors (political, economic/market, and nonprofit) and ecological units (soil and water 
conservation districts) and at different scales (regional actors). This finding could explain 
why scholars within the MRG urban watershed have characterized the watershed as rigid 
and inflexible despite the presence of multiple actors  (Benson et al., 2014, p. 223; 
Carpenter & Brock, 2008). Therefore, we could characterize the governance of the MRG 
urban watershed as minimally polycentric circumscribed within a largely monocentric 




Figure 3.11: Actors’ overall level of polycentric connection (FPGI) 
 
3.6.2 (Re) interpreting Polycentric Water Governance in Terms of Social Network 
Analysis 
We develop an ordinary least squares (OLS) model (Table 3.3 below) to explore 
the relationships between the FGPI and some network graph statistics to identify some 
implication(s) for functional polycentric governance. We include two measures for actor 
centrality within a network—closeness centrality and betweenness centrality—and two 
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measures for actor clustering within a network—clustering coefficient and topological 
coefficient. All four of these measures are a ratio coefficient measured from zero to one. 
The closeness centrality of a social node or actor measures how close an actor is to the 
other actors within the network; it also reveals how fast information spreads within the 
network (Newman & Girvan, 2004; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The betweenness 
centrality of a social node presents a political view of network flow by indicating the degree 
of control an actor has over the other actors within the network (Anthonisse, 1971; Brandes, 
2008; Newman, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  The clustering coefficient of an actor 
(n) is the ratio of the number of connections between n and its neighbors and the maximum 
number of possible connections that could exist between n and its neighbors (Newman & 
Girvan, 2004). The topological coefficient extends the clustering coefficient further by 
measuring the extent to which actor n shares neighbors with other actors in the network 
(Newman & Girvan, 2004).  
Table 3.3: OLS regression models predicting FPGI 
Variable Full Model Parsimonious Model 1 
Constant -0.409 -0.408 
Closeness Centrality 1.099*** 1.096*** 
Betweenness Centrality 1.637*** 1.643*** 
Clustering Coefficient -0.004    - 
Topological Coefficient -0.159*** -0.164*** 
Full Model Summary                    Parsimonious Model Summary     
n  = 191                                          n  = 191                                       
R2 =  0.85                                      R2 =  0.85 
Std. Error  = 0.0368142   Std. Error = 0.036719 
F = 271.027***                            F = 363.232655*** 
 
Significance: p < 0.01***  
Coefficients of  variables shown are unstandardized regression coefficients 
1 Parsimonious model results are produced using backward selection 
 
Our discussion here will focus on the parsimonious model but we will touch briefly 
on the full model. In the full OLS model, all variables, except the clustering coefficient, 
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have significant relationships (p-value < 0.01) with the functional polycentric governance 
index (FPGI). Backward selection was used to develop the parsimonious model. All three 
variables—closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, and topological coefficient—have 
significant relationship with the FPGI; together, they explain 85% of the variance of the 
FPGI. Both the full and parsimonious models reveal that an actor’s degree of centrality is 
positively related to its FPGI; the opposite holds for an actor’s degree of clustering within 
the network. This has two interconnected implications for polycentric governance.  
Firstly, an actor’s multiple connections (clustering) within a network of actors do 
not mean necessarily that it is connected polycentrically within a governance system. 
Polycentric governance is not only about how many are connected to an actor, but more 
importantly about the heterogeneity of who are connected to (Aligica & Tarko, 2012; 
McGinnis, 2005; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]). Hence, reiterating, despite the presence of 
multiple actors within the MRG, its governance framework is still rigid and inflexible 
(Benson et al., 2014, p. 223; Carpenter & Brock, 2008) because connections formed within 
this watershed are less heterogeneous (multi-scale and multi-sector), thus making the 
governance framework more monocentric than polycentric.  
Secondly, the positive relationships between an actor’s FPGI and its closeness 
centrality and betweenness centrality drums home the point that polycentric governance is 
about political influence (closeness centrality) and ease of information dissemination 
(betweenness centrality). We earlier touched on how our method accounts for, albeit 
implicitly, political power in polycentric governance. However, political power, resources, 
and information in polycentric governance call for in-depth conceptual and empirical 
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analyses beyond the scope of this paper (see some conceptual discussions on this issue in 
works like Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Huitema et al., 2009; McGinnis, 2011). 
3.7 Conclusion 
This paper has presented a methodological approach to studying the polycentricity 
of urban watershed governance. It excavated the theoretical pillars of polycentricity by 
synthesizing the works of the Bloomington School of Political Economy and the PUR 
research by spatial planners. These conceptual pillars define polycentricity as 1) the 
multiplicity and functional connectivity of actors, and 2) the mix of actor types (sectors) 
and governing scales. The paper re-interprets these theoretical pillars using the SENA 
framework. The SENA language and interpretation, specifically the concept of scale 
mismatch bridging edges (SMBEs), are used to develop a methodological approach in 
studying the polycentricity of the Middle Rio Grande urban watershed in New Mexico. 
The methodological approach involved developing three sub-indices—PPI, MI, and NPI—
and an overall index—FPGI—to study the polycentricity of the MRG urban watershed 
governance. 
Two key insights are highlighted in the paper regarding the polycentricity of the 
MRG’s urban watershed governance. First, the governance of the MRG urban watershed 
is characterized as a predominantly monocentric governing system with elements of 
polycentricity. Empirically, this implies that the expected density of connections between 
local-local actors and local-regional actors was very low. This is also reflected in the low 
average FPGI score of actors (10 percent). In fact, the presence of more federal, state and 
other regional government actors within the MRG urban watershed, as noted by Benson et 
al. (2014), requires that both local and regional government actors should do a better job 
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of reaching out to each other in governing this watershed. This outreach should include 
more localities, rather than focusing on actors within the densely populated areas (like the 
Albuquerque area) because the density of SMBEs between local-local and local-regional 
actors were concentrated within very few localities. 
Second, the analysis showed that polycentric governance is primarily about the 
heterogeneity of an actor’s connections. Actors within the MRG urban watershed were 
more connected to political actors than with the market and nonprofit actors. The point and 
perhaps contention based on this finding is that polycentric water governance could above 
all be about the politics of power and resource distribution. Acknowledging the need for 
more empirical testing to ascertain the centrality of power and resource distribution in 
polycentric governance, this finding could support why some view polycentricism in a 
normative sense. Actors’ strategic decision to connect with others within different sectors 
and at different governing scales could be the ‘right move’ to save the urban water 
commons. On the other hand, the fact that actors within the MRG urban watershed 
governance have connections to political, rather than market and nonprofit actors, re-
echoes why this governing system is viewed as rigid and inflexible (Benson et al., 2014, p. 
223; Carpenter & Brock, 2008). Actors possessing more heterogeneous connections 
(across multiple scales and sectors) make the MRG urban watershed governance more 
polycentric and perhaps more flexible and less rigid; however, will this guarantee actors’ 
strategic access to power and resources? This could be a central question for future 




CHAPTER IV: GOVERNING THE URBAN WATER COMMONS: INTER-
ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATIONS IN A POLYCENTRIC ECOLOGY OF 
URBAN WATER POLICY GAMES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The governance of social-ecological systems (e.g. urban water commons/resources) 
involves a constellation of policy actors and policy institutions9 (Lubell, 2013). Scholars 
have engaged different theoretical and methodological approaches to study the interactions 
of actors and institutions in governing coupled social and ecological resources. Mark 
Lubell and associates have invoked Norton Long’s (1958) ecology of games (EG) as the 
theoretical lens to conceptualize and test empirically the activities of actors and institutions 
in managing water resources (e.g. Lubell, Henry, & McCoy, 2010; Lubell et al., 2014). 
Social network and social capital concepts and game theory are used to frame and test 
hypotheses about actors’ collaborative behaviors in governing social-ecological systems. 
Scott and Thomas (2015) developed an empirical model to test whether the decision of 
actors to collaborate in governing water resources is subject to the ‘law of diminishing 
marginal returns. 
                                                          
9 A policy institution is the venue or forum constituted of formal rules and informal norms at the meso-level 
that determines the patterning of interactions among policy actors (individuals or organizations), with interest 
or stake (e.g. appropriation and political interests) in the decisions made at the policy institution level (Lubell, 
2013; Lubell et al., 2014). Actor or policy actor is used interchangeably in this paper. Again, collaborative 




Even though the constellation of policy actors and institutions suggests 
polycentricity in governing social-ecological systems, empirical models have yet to 
explicitly test for the role of polycentrism in governing social-ecological systems. 
Polycentric governance or ‘polycentric political systems’ implies the existence of multiple 
decision-making centers that are formally autonomous operate under certain sets of rules 
(Aligica & Tarko, 2012; McGinnis & Ostrom, 2012; E. Ostrom, 2010a; V. Ostrom, 
1999[1972]; Polanyi, 1951). For instance, numerous studies on public service delivery in 
urban and rural areas supported the argument that a mix of variously sized jurisdictions are 
effective in public service delivery through intergovernmental arrangements (McGinnis, 
1999; E. Ostrom et al., 1978; V. Ostrom, 2008a, 2008b). In the case of coupled social and 
ecological systems, Lubell et al. (2014, p. 5) infer from their findings that the governance 
of the San Francisco Bay water resources is “appearing polycentric.”  
This paper moves beyond the ‘appearance’ of polycentricity and develops an 
empirical model to explicitly explore how polycentric governance shapes inter-
organizational collaborations in urban water governance. An index is created to 
operationalize polycentric governance, and is used to explicate the emergence of inter-
organizational collaboration in governing the Middle Rio Grande (MRG) urban water 
commons. The next section reviews the literature, and proposes hypotheses about the role 
of polycentric governance in shaping the collaborative outcomes between actors in 
governing social-ecological systems. This is followed by a discussion of the method—
exponential random graph model (ERGM), the study context and the data for the study. 
The descriptive statistics and results from the ERGM are then discussed. A brief summative 
section concludes the paper. 
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4.2 Polycentric Ecology of Urban Water Policy Games: Theoretical 
Context 
Urban water governance can be conceptualized as the concurrent operation of 
multiple policy games within a defined geo-political arena (Lubell, 2013; Lubell et al., 
2014). Policy games refers to the interactions of policy actors and their participation in 
policy institutions—a rule-governed collective-choice process with jurisdiction over one 
or more collective-action problems—to influence policies by gaining information, 
credibility, and political influence (Berardo & Scholz, 2010; Lubell, 2013). Figure 4.1 
portrays a constellation of interdependencies in governing water resources.10 Policy actors 
(e.g. city/county governments, urban planning departments, and water coalition groups) 
participate in three policy institutions—urban government/politics, soil and water 
conservation (SWC), and environmental advocacy (EA). Policy institutions can have 
overlapping jurisdictions. For instance, in the urban ecology of water policy games (Figure 
4.1), decisions on soil and water conservation are influenced by the zoning decisions of 
city/county governments as well as other regulatory controls by the soil and water 
conservation district (SWCD). Policy actors’ participation in these three policy institutions 
are considered as three on-going policy games.  
                                                          




Figure 4.1: Ecology of Three Policy Games in Governing Urban Water Resources 
 
The EG framework interrogates how actors solve collective-action problems 
through coordination and cooperation (Lubell et al., 2014). Coordination and cooperation 
in policy decisions is complex due to factors like political power and the multiple 
motivational and payoff structures facing policy actors (North, 1990, 2005; Scharpf, 
1997a). The EG framework, hence, draws on multiple theoretical lenses to explicate factors 
that could explain the emergent collaborative policy networks within a given policy arena. 
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This paper draws on some of these theories to test a set of complementary hypotheses about 
how the MRG’s policy network structure reveals supporting or hindering factors for 
collaboration and coordination among policy actors in governing this urban watershed. The 
subsequent discussions develop the theoretically-grounded hypotheses to be tested. 
4.2.1 Centralization and Closure: Information, Trust, and Risks in Collaborative 
Policy Networks 
Within the EG framework, collaborative policy networks11 reveal the social capital 
structures that policy actors depend on to minimize transaction cost of coordination and 
cooperation (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Feiock & Scholz, 2009; Lubell et al., 2010; Margerum, 
2011). Social capital is simply the “aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 248). Several types of social 
capital are delineated in the literature—e.g. centralization or bridging, closure or bonding, 
and linking social capital (see Szreter, 2000; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004; Woolcock, 2001). 
This paper will limit itself to discussions of bridging and bonding social capitals.  
Bridging social capital, often characterized as a star network (where one actor 
serves a central node or there is the absence of triadic relations among connected actors), 
is about relations of mutuality and respect among actors in a social network who see 
themselves as having different social identities (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973, 1985; 
Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). Centralization or bridging social capital in a policy network 
suggests that policy actors prefer more diverse contacts and access to outside information 
(Prell, 2012; Prell, Hubacek, & Reed, 2009). It is associated with coordination games, that 
                                                          




is, when policy actors prefer to connect to few popular policy actors to gain easy access to 
information and roughly agree on a common strategy to deal with a problem (Lubell et al., 
2014). Centralization, therefore, reveals a hierarchical policy network whereby few policy 
actors with the capacity and resources to coordinate emerge as the focal points (Carlsson 
& Sandström, 2008; Sandström & Carlsson, 2008). In their risk hypothesis, Berardo and 
Scholz (2010) found that policy actors in natural resource governance build bridging ties 
in low social-ecological risk situations—when the collective action problem is less 
complex and does not have far-reaching consequences. The paper test for the presence of 
centralization using the geometrically weighted degree (GWD) term using the statnet 
program. This is an anti-preferential attachment term which indicates the probability of 
policy actors forming bridging ties or connecting to more popular actors (that is when the 
GWD term is negative and statistically significant) (Hunter, 2007). It is expected that: 
Hypothesis 1: The collaborative policy network in governing the MRG urban 
watershed is driven by high centralization if policy actors face low social-ecological 
risk situations. 
Bonding social capital or transitive closure, seen as “closed” or triadic relations 
among actors (Actor A is connected to B, B is connected to C, and C is connected to A), is 
about trust and co-operation between social network members who often see themselves 
as having a shared social identity (Coleman, 1988; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). Policy 
actors form bonding ties in dealing with cooperation games; that is, they form cohesive 
networks through building redundant and strong connections with other policy actors to 
create trust and security in relationships (Angst & Hirschi, 2016; Lubell et al., 2010; Lubell 
& Lippert, 2011). In natural resource governance, bonding ties are formed by policy actors 
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in high social-ecological risk situations—when the collective action problem is complex 
and policy actors have high incentive to be uncooperative (e.g. lie or cheat) (Berardo & 
Scholz, 2010; Burt, 2005; Coleman, 1988; Heckathorn & Maser, 1987). Forming bonding 
ties helps policy actors to gain multiple sources of credible information, monitor and 
sanction defectors, and solve complex collective action dilemmas in natural resource 
governance (Angst & Hirschi, 2016; Berardo, 2009). The presence of bonding social 
capital is tested for in statnet by using the geometrically weighted edgewise shared partner 
(GWESP) term—a statistically significant coefficient indicates the presence of transitive 
closure or bonding social capital within the network (Robins, Lewis, & Wang, 2012). This 
parameter simply illustrates the axiom that “my friend’s friend is my friend.” The 
geometrically weighted dyadwise shared partners (GWDSP) term is often added to the 
model to separate transitive closure from an accumulation of many connections by chance 
(Hunter, 2007; Snijders, Pattison, Robins, & Handcock, 2006). In other words, we need the 
GWDSP term to help accurately determine if we are properly capturing bonding social 
capital within the network. Based on the discussion of bonding social capital, it is expected 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The collaborative policy network in governing the MRG urban 
watershed is driven by high transitive closure if policy actors face high social-
ecological risk situations. 
Even though hypothesis 1 and 2 suggest that bridging and bonding social capital 
are mutually exclusive—the tradeoff argument by Berardo and Scholz (2010)—this may 
not be true in other social-ecological settings. Berardo (2009) found that both bonding and 
bridging social capitals are found in high-risk social-ecological situations. Lubell et al. 
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(2014) link the presence of both centralization and transitive closure to ‘polycentrism’ 
within a collaborative policy network. In-depth discussion on this will be offered in the 
polycentric governance section of this paper. 
4.2.2 Actor Activities and Political Homophily 
The attributes of policy actors also influence the probability of tie formation 
between actors in a policy network. Lubell et al. (2014, p. 1) refer to this as the “actor 
hypothesis.” Policy actors within an urban ecology of games solve collective action 
problems by using their resources and capacities—e.g. political, financial, information and 
technical—to coordinate and influence policy decisions (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Lubell et 
al., 2014; Scharpf, 1997a). Some policy actors with greater capacities and access to 
resources become more active (i.e. form more ties) within collaborative policy networks. 
In the case of the United States, Lubell et al. (2014) note the high activity of federal and 
state government actors often drives collaborative policy networks because these 
organizations have financial and technical/information resources, and delegated higher 
level political power to coordinate and influence policies. Borg, Toikka, and Primmer 
(2015) also find these outcomes in conservation governance networks in Finland. Further, 
Angst and Hirschi (2016) find this to be true in their dynamic network model of a regional 
park project in Switzerland. Therefore, in testing the actor hypothesis, it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 3: The collaborative policy network in governing the MRG urban 
watershed is driven by federal and state government actors who have greater 
capacities and access to more resources and power to influence coordination and 
cooperation mechanisms in policy decisions. 
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Another dimension to the actor hypothesis is homophily. Homophily explains the 
tendency of tie formation between policy actors who possess similar attributional 
characteristics or belief systems (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Zafonte & 
Sabatier, 1998). Government actors are relatively more homogenous than non-government 
actors; they also have greater concentrations of resources (Lubell et al., 2014) than non-
government actors in terms of their sources of technical and financial resources (e.g. access 
to public funds) and political power (i.e. statutes). These conditions potentially minimize 
conflict and transaction costs while concurrently fostering trust among these homogenous 
policy actors.  In the United States, local government agencies are more likely to 
collaborate with state and federal government agencies than with nongovernment agencies 
to access technical and financial resources. Therefore, it is expected expect that: 
Hypothesis 4: The collaborative policy network in governing the MRG urban 
watershed is driven by homophily of government actors (political homophily) to 
(re)distribute technical and financial resources among different levels of 
government. 
4.2.3 Diminishing Marginal Returns in Collaborative Policy Networks 
Interorganizational collaboration is influenced by policy actors’ joint participation 
in collaborative groups. We can think of collaborative groups broadly as the policy 
institutions—forums or venues—that bring together policy actors to access resources 
and/or manipulate policy decisions (Scott & Thomas, 2015).  Collaborative groups foster 
interorganizational collaborations among policy actors because they build credibility and 
rapport among participating policy actors (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Scott & 
Thomas, 2015). These groups foster interorganizational collaborations because of 
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mechanisms like 1) principled engagement—participating policy actors can easily dialogue 
because they develop shared concepts, definitions and terminologies—and/or 2) increased 
capacity for joint action— participating policy actors get to know the capabilities, goals, 
motivations, and capabilities of other policy actors (Emerson et al., 2012). Principled 
engagement and increased capacity for joint action explain how participating policy actors 
in collaborative groups have lower transaction costs in finding suitable collaborating 
partners (Emerson et al., 2012; Scott & Thomas, 2015).  
Scott and Thomas (2015), however, test the argument that the increased 
participation of policy actors in collaborating groups could lead to no or “diminished’ 
capacity for policy actors to engage in interorganizational collaborations with member or 
non-member policy actors. This supports, empirically, the point that policy actors’ resource 
and cognitive capacity limits lead to payoff and strategy externalities as policy actors 
explore collaborative relationships within the confines of their limited abilities (see detailed 
discussion on these externalities in Bednar & Page, 2007; Lubell, 2013; Lubell et al., 2010; 
Margerum, 2007). It should be noted here that there is no test for policy actors’ co-
participation in the same collaborative group as was done in Scott and Thomas (2015). The 
paper only adopts a generalist perspective to explore how policy actors’ participation in 
multiple collaborative groups or policy institutions influences collaboration ties. Based on 
this discussion, it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 5a: The probability of collaborative relationships among policy actors in 




Hypothesis 5b: The probability of collaborative relationships among policy actors in 
governing the MRG urban watershed decreases as policy actors’ participation in policy 
institution increases and exceeds a given threshold. 
4.2.4 Segmentation and Polycentrism in Collaborative Policy Networks 
Situating themselves within the EG framework, Lubell et al. (2014) lay an 
important methodological foundation for a robust test of how polycentric governance 
drives collaboration in policy networks. Firstly, they invoke the V. Ostrom (1994b, p. 225) 
definition of polycentrism being “a self-organizing system” composed of (1) many 
autonomous units that are formally independent of and influencing one another, and (2) 
processes of cooperation, competition, conflict, and conflict resolution. Secondly, they 
draw on V. Ostrom et al. (1961) to test the hypotheses that polycentric governance exhibits 
the concurrent existence of higher level institutions (centralization) and lower level 
institutions (decentralization) within the same governing system. Thirdly, like Berardo and 
Scholz (2010), Lubell et al. (2014) found that centralization (bridging social capital) and 
transitive closure/decentralization (bonding social capital) had statistically significant 
opposite signs within the same social-ecological system. In other words, the network 
exhibited a “core-periphery” structure due to popularity effect (negative GWD) and 
triangulation effect (positive GWESP) (Snijders et al., 2006). This core-periphery structure 
of negative GWD (centralization) and positive GWESP (decentralization) is also known as 
“segmentation” (Robins, Snijders, Wang, Handcock, & Pattison, 2007, p. 201). In this 
paper, the thesis that a segmented network is an evidence of a polycentric network will be 
referred to as the Lubell-Robins-Wang polycentric hypothesis.  
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A segmented policy network is a necessary but insufficient condition to describe a 
governing system as polycentric. Segmentation only describes the co-constitution of 
multiple governing scales within a policy network. Apart from governing scales, 
polycentrism also looks at the co-existence of multiple sectors (e.g. political, judicial, and 
market) within which policy actors operate at the different governing scales (Aligica & 
Tarko, 2012; McGinnis, 2005; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]). These multiple sectors constitute 
themselves as “islands of polycentric order” (e.g. market and political polycentric orders) 
and they influence each other (Aligica & Tarko, 2012, p. 247). Taken together, discussions 
(ontological, epistemological and/or methodological) on the polycentricity of governing 
systems must, at a minimum, take into consideration some of the following—the autonomy 
of policy actors within the system, and policy actors’ operation at multiple governing 
scales—and within multiple sectors. In fact, the literature on Social-ecological Network 
Approach (SENA) also reveals that the concurrent existence of multiple governing scales 
in a network does not sufficiently tell us whether or not policy actors are adequately 
connecting to multiple policy actors at different governing scales (see Bergsten et al., 2014; 
Bodin & Tengö, 2012; Rathwell & Peterson, 2012; Sayles, 2015; Schoon et al., 2014). To 
put it differently, we must understand how many scale mismatch bridging edges (SMBEs) 
or connections policy actors possess.  
Discussing all these debates and how they could help in a robust testing of 
polycentric governance exceeds the scope of this paper. This task is however addressed in 
the previous chapter where a scalable index—Functional Polycentric Governance Index 
(FPGI; see chapter 3) is developed. The FPGI is a policy actor level index ranging from 0 
(not connected polycentrically) to 1 (fully connected polycentrically). It indicates the 
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degree of connectivity between a policy actor and other policy actors operating within 
different sectors and at different governing scales within the system. This index is included 
to test for two interrelated hypotheses on how polycentric governance drives 
interorganizational collaboration in the MRG’s urban water policy network. The first 
hypothesis (hypothesis 6a below) tests the Lubell et al.’s (2014) segmentation argument, 
which as noted previously, is a necessary but insufficient condition for characterizing a 
governing system as polycentric. The second hypothesis (hypothesis 6b) tests whether the 
FPGI is a statistically significant driver of the observed MRG collaborative policy network. 
Therefore, it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 6a: The MRG’s collaborative policy network exhibits characteristics of a 
polycentric governing system if its collaborative policy network is segmented (negative 
centralization and positive decentralization coefficients) 
Hypothesis 6b: The MRG’s collaborative policy network is polycentric if, in addition 
to being segmented, it has a statistically significant functional polycentric index. (Note: 
the direction of the coefficient will determine if polycentric governance drives 
interorganizational collaboration within the MRG). 
4.3 The Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs) 
ERGMs are statistical models to explain how collaborative policy networks 
emerge, especially within the EG framework (Frank and Strauss (1986). An observed 
collaborative policy network is considered as a possible outcome of stochastic network 
processes (Lubell et al., 2014; Robins, Pattison, Kalish, & Lusher, 2007; Robins, Snijders, 
et al., 2007). Collaboration tie, the dependent variable, is defined as the probability that 
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two policy actors will collaborate. The ERGM uses a Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
fitting approach, and explore the influences of a set of independent variables on 
collaboration tie. These independent variables include both endogenous variables 
indicating structural characteristics of a network and exogenous variables related to actor 
and dyadic covariate effects (Prell, 2012; Scott, 2015).  Table 4.1 below presents the set of 
independent variables and their expected sign of impacts to support different hypotheses.  
A generalized ERGM can be presented as:  





(𝑥) … … … … … … … … … … . (1) 
where, 
Pr(X=x) = Conditional odds ratio of observing a tie between two nodes (e.g. policy actors); 
X = A social network; 
Q = Network configuration of type Q comprising tie variables that are conditionally 
dependent given the rest of the network; 
ZQ = Set of graph statistics representing the network endogenous effects;  
𝜃Q = Vector of parameters corresponding to the graph statistics, and; 
K = Normalizing constant. 
In a social network, the formation and dissolution of collaborative ties not only 
depend on the network structural parameters, but also on exogenous attributes of policy 
actors and other dyadic covariates (Morris, Handcock, & Hunter, 2008; Robins, Elliott, & 
Pattison, 2001). To accommodate this, Equation (1) is modified as:  
𝑃𝑟(𝑋 = 𝑥|𝑌 = 𝑦) =
1
𝐾(𝜃)
exp ∑{𝜃𝑄𝑍𝑄(𝑥) + 𝜃Ʌ𝑍Ʌ(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑄,Ʌ




Y =  A set of attribute variables 
Ʌ = Variables of  interactions between node attributes and network configuration (i.e. 
comprise of tie variables and nodal attribute variables) 
θɅ = Vector of parameters for social selectHooohoooion configurations involving an 
interaction of network (x) and attribute (y) variables; 
ZɅ = Sufficient statistics for social selection configurations involving an interaction of 
network (x) and attribute (y) variables; 
K(θ) = Normalizing constant. 




1 2 3 4 5a 5b 6a 6b 
Centralization (Bonding Social Capital)  +      -  
Triangulation (Bonding Social Capital)  +      + 
Act. of Federal Gov’t Actors   +      
Act. of State Gov’t Actors   +      
Act. of  SWCDs   -      
Act. of NPO Env’t Actors   -      
Act. of Ed./Research Actors   -      
Political Homophily    +     
# Participation Groups     +    
#Participation (squared)      -   
Polycentric Governance       significant 
Note: 
1. Dependent variable = collaboration tie between two policy actors 
2. + = positively correlated (probability of collaboration tie increases) 
3. - = positively correlated (probability of collaboration tie decreases) 
4. Significant = statistically significant 
5. Act. = Activities 
6. NPO= Nonprofit 
7. Ed. = Education 










4.4 Study Area  
The Middle Rio Grande (MRG) watershed is part of the Rio Grande’s watershed 
and is located in central New Mexico (NM), covering approximately 3,060 square miles. 
The MRG watershed extends from the Cochiti Dam to the Elephant Butte Reservoir in 
central New Mexico (Figure 4.2). The study area encompasses nine soil and watershed 
districts (Valencia SWCD, Ciudad SWCD, Socorro SWCD, Santa Fe-Pojoaque SWCD, 
Sierra SWCD, Coronado SWCD, Claunch-Pinto SWCD, Doña Ana SWCD, and Lava 
SWCD), and seven main counties (Santa Fe, Sandoval, Bernalillo, Valencia, Socorro, 
Torrance, and Cibola). It is also home to six Native American pueblos—Cochiti, San 
Felipe, Santo Domingo, Santa Ana, Sandia, and Isleta.  
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Figure 4.2: The MRG Urban Watershed  
The MRG watershed involves multiple inter-state compacts such as the: Animas-
La Plata Project Compact (1968), Canadian River Compact (1950), Colorado River 
Compact (1922), Costilla Creek Compact (1946), La Plata River Compact (1925), Pecos 
River Compact (1948) Rio Grande Compact (1939), and the Upper Colorado River Basin 
Compact (1949) (Buynak & Oglesby, 2014). The multi-jurisdictional nature of this water 
commons requires multiple players, both within and out of New Mexico, in governing the 
MRG. Policy actors, mostly federal and state government agencies, have a strong presence 
in the MRG partly due to the multi-state nature of the Rio Grande water commons, as well 
as the extensive amount of public lands in this area (Benson et al., 2014). These lands are 
owned and managed by agencies such as the U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land 
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Management, National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, NM State Parks 
Division, and NM Forest Service (ibid). Internally, the MRG urban water governance is 
also controlled by tribal agreements between the federal government and the pueblos 
within (Benson et al., 2014). These pueblos have “prior and paramount” rights to water; 
that is, there exists the right for the pueblos to use the Rio Grande River to irrigate their 
lands within the Middle Rio Grande Conservation District (MRGCD) (Mann, 2007). The 
presence of multiple internal (state and local) and external (federal) actors and legal 
agreements/mandates make the MRG an ideal case study for polycentric governance.   
4.5 Data Preparation  
The study employed the archival-based snowball network sampling (Burt, 1983; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994) to collect network data on policy actors and policy institutions 
involved in water and environmental conservation activities in the MRG. The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) databases on urban watershed collaborative 
partnerships served as the initial point to identify policy actors within the study area. Next, 
the websites of these identified actors and archival documents (e.g. academic documents, 
action/strategic plan and memorandum of understandings) related to these actors were 
identified to collect data. Characteristics of these organizations collected, for instance, 
whether they are a nonprofit or government (political) organization and their past and 
present project/policy/funding collaborators. Steps three and four entailed the same process 
utilized in step 2 to identify the environment-related partners until the list could not be 




In all, more than 700 websites and archival documents (e.g. online newspaper 
articles, academic documents, government documents, annual reports, grant databases, 
budget documents, memorandum of understandings, and action/strategic plans) were 
collected through this network snowball approach using google search and LexisNexis. 
However, the study limited itself to collaborations occurring within the past 10 years, 
which reduced the number of websites and archival documents analyzed to 473. 
Collaboration tie/link between two actors (organizations) was measured as a non-
directional relationship (cannot distinguish relationship from A to B and vice-versa). Partly 
informed by Lubell’s (2004a) coding parameters, the presence of a collaborative tie 
between two actors (e.g. A and B), which is the dependent variable, was determined as a 
yes (1) or no (0) if:  
6) A is a project partner (or listed as a partner) of B or vice versa; 
7) A provides financial assistance (listed as a financial donor, corporate sponsor, 
and/or grantor) to B or vice versa; 
8) A and B have joint implementation agreement (JIA) and/or memorandum of 
understanding (MOU); 
9) A and B share logistics and personnel (including volunteering); and 
10) A and B have a shared permitting or regulatory activities. 
Multiple approaches were adopted to ensure the reliability of the data and the 
analysis conducted even though this was a single coder project and required a relatively 
simple coding approach to collect network data (i.e. absence or presence of a collaboration 
tie between two organizations if any of the above coding parameters were present). After 
developing the coding parameter, the author sampled 40 of the data records already 
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obtained—this included 5 websites, 1 grant database, and the rest were online newspaper 
articles, academic papers and annual reports of some already identified organizations based 
on the first 1 outlined in Figure 3.4 above. The author solicited the assistance of a colleague 
to help assist in assessing the inter-coder reliability in analyzing the data (see also Campbell 
et al., 2013). Both the author and his colleague analyzed the data independently using the 
coding parameters.  
Two interrelated errors were seen by comparing the adjacency matrix (which actors 
have a collaboration tie between them) obtained by the author and his colleague. A total of 
21 actors were obtained in one matrix and 24 actors were obtained in the other. This 
evidently also affected the adjacency matrices obtained—a pair of actors had a missing 
collaboration tie in one matrix and not the other matrix. These errors were mainly the result 
of ambiguities in the organizational names (and sometimes acronyms) as well as duplicates 
in the list of organizations because some data records used a department or project to 
represent a larger organization while other data records used the name of the large 
organization. For example, sometimes Bosque del Apache National Wildlife Refuge and 
Friends of Bosque del Apache were used interchangeably even though the former is a 
project by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the latter is a nonprofit group established 
to support the project.  
These errors were remedied by ensuring consistent use of organization names and 
acronyms. Again, even though the use of the NVivo qualitative data software made it easier 
to code and analyze the 40 sample of data records, it also made it easier to catch some of 
these and other potential errors. Hence, since the coding parameters were relatively simple 
and easy to use, and most of the data records involved looking at a specific part of an 
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organization’s website (e.g. finding the “corporate sponsor” or “partners” section on the 
website), the author analyzed the data manually to help reduce the above mentioned and 
other potential errors that could have been missed by using NVivo. The preliminary 
analyses were compared with both published (some have been cited in the chapter) and 
unpublished scholarly works to have a general sense of potential inaccuracies. These 
preliminary analyses were also shared with a researcher who has studied this site to also 
determine potential inaccuracies. 
4.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 present standard measures for centrality and clustering based 
on the type of policy actors. Degree centrality reports a policy actor’s number of 
connections and a policy actor’s eigenvector centrality shows its connections to well-
connected policy actors—those with high degree (more collaboration ties). Betweenness 
centrality presents a political view of network flow by indicating the degree of control a 
policy actor has over others—i.e. the number of connections flowing through the policy 
actor (Anthonisse, 1971; Brandes, 2008; Newman, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). From 
Figure 4.3, the federal government, local government and environmental nonprofit policy 
actors play coordinating roles—are well-connected—within the MRG’s collaborative 
policy network. Generally, with a median degree of 13 (average degree of 19), this 
collaborative policy network shown in Figure 4.5 below has a “fat tail” distribution—many 
low-degree policy nodes and few high-degree policy nodes—compared with a randomly 












Figure 4.5: Comparing degree distributions for observed and randomly simulated 
network 
 






















The two standard measures of clustering in Figure 5 also show clustering within 
the MRG’s urban water policy network. The clustering coefficient of a policy actor (n) is 
the ratio of the number of connections between n and its neighbors and the maximum 
number of possible connections that could exist between n and its neighbors (Newman & 
Girvan, 2004). The topological coefficient extends the clustering coefficient further by 
measuring the extent to which policy actor n shares neighbors with other actors in the 
network (Newman & Girvan, 2004). The SWCDs, New Mexico’s state agencies, federal 
government agencies and environmental nonprofit organizations are highly clustered 
within the MRG urban watershed. This indicates the potential for transitive closure 
whenever these policy actors form collaborative relationships with other actors.  
The paper also explore whether there is clustering among similar policy actors—
homophily within the policy network, and use mixing matrices (Goodreau, Handcock, 
Hunter, Butts, and Morris (2008), as shown in Table 4.2,  to examine the propensity for 
similar policy actors to be connected. About 50 percent of the total connected dyads (939 
out of 1881) involve dyadic connections between government policy actors. This supports 
a propensity for government policy actors to be connected.  
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4.7 The ERGM Results 
Statnet is used to run ERGM analysis. Five ERGM models (Table 4.3) were built 
to fit the observed collaborative policy network in governing the MRG urban watershed. 
The ERGM, like the logistic regression, explains the probability of observed presence or 
absence of a collaboration tie between two policy actors. The odds of two policy actors 
having a collaboration tie is estimated by exponentiating the parameter coefficient to obtain 
a multiplicative effect on the odds ratio. The naïve model controls for the baseline odds of 
observing whether two randomly selected policy actors have a collaboration tie by using 
the observed density of the network. The parameter coefficient (-2.24) is exponentiated to 
obtain an odds of 0.11 to 1 of observing a tie between two policy actors. This naïve model 
assumes that collaborative decisions are uniformly distributed among policy actors and 
does not take into consideration the characteristics of these actors and the strategic 
decisions they often make in deciding who to collaborate with. The negative density 
parameter means that there are fewer observed collaboration ties than expected in random 
networks or there is less than 50 percent chance of forming any collaborating tie within 



























Density -2.24*** -7.22*** -2.46***  -6.96*** -5.079*** 
Triangulation   1.81*** - 1.67*** 0.33** 
Multiple Connectivity  0.02*** - 0.002 -0.03*** 
Centralization   3.72*** - 5.46*** -0.78* 
Act. of Federal Gov’t Actors   0.86*** 0.18*** 0.07 
Act. of State Gov’t Actors   0.32*** -0.01 0.14** 
Act. of  SWCDs   0.10 0.08 0.93*** 
Act. of NPO Env’t Actors   -0.20*** -0.01 0.02 
Act. of Ed./Research Actors   -0.09 -0.01 0.05 
# Participation Groups  0.14***  0.14*** 0.08*** 
#Participation (squared)  -0.01***  -0.01*** -0.01*** 
Political Homophily    0.32*** 0.25*** 
Polycentric Governance     0.10*** 
BIC 12,383 10,842 12, 006 10, 665 9, 534 
Degrees of freedom 1 6 6 12 13 
Note: 
1. Significance = ***p-value < 0.001; **p-value <0.01; * p-value <0.05 
2. Act. = Activities 
3. NPO= Nonprofit 
4. Ed. = Education 
5. Env’t = Environment 
 
The remaining four models take into account the structural characteristics of 
collaborative policy network and the attributes of policy within these actors. The “strategic 
decision model” (SDM), which is a slightly modified version of Lubell et al. (2014, p. 7), 
captures how collaboration decisions are mediated by network structure (bridging and 
bonding social capitals) and policy actors’ attributes (principled engagement and increased 
capacity for joint action). The SDM fails to accept hypothesis 1 (high centralization or 
bridging social capital drives collaboration ties) but accepts hypothesis 2 (transitive closure 
or bonding social capital drives collaboration ties), hypothesis 5a (policy actors’ 
participation in policy institutions or collaboration groups), and hypothesis 5b 
(collaboration ties decreases if the number of collaborative groups a policy actor 
participates in exceeds a threshold).  
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The SDM shows that collaboration ties within the MRG policy network is not 
driven by bridging social capital or highly centralized policy actors (positive and 
statistically significant GWD parameter) but by bonding social capital or policy actors 
forming transitive closure (positive and statistically significant GWESP parameter). For 
the GWESP, the SDM shows that two policy actors are more than 600% more likely to be 
connected if they share a common partner [6.11=exp(1.81)]. This characterizes the MRG’s 
collaborative policy network as mainly a decentralized structure whereby policy actors 
build ties based on trust to address cooperation dilemmas in governing this urban 
watershed. # Participation Groups has a positive and significant impact. A unit increase in 
# participation groups increases by 15% [exp(0.14)] the likelihood that the policy actor will 
collaborate with another policy actor. However, collaboration ties diminish, by a very small 
margin (the odds of observing a tie decreases by 1%), when the number of collaborative 
groups exceeds a certain threshold. This suggests that there could be an optimal size of 
urban water governance. This also provides some evidence of policy actors having less 
benefit if they already participate in multiple collaborative groups (Margerum, 2007). The 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) shows that the SDM is better (BIC=10,842) than the 
naïve model (BIC=12,383). 
The “political capacity model” (PCM), similar to Lubell et al. (2014, p. 7), explains 
how collaborative ties are driven by the activities of different policy actors. The ‘activities 
of local government actors’ is used as the reference group in this model. The result shows 
1) two types of policy actors—Federal and state government actors—with significantly 
higher level of activity than local government actors, and 2) one type of policy actor—
nonprofit environmental groups with significantly higher level of activity than local 
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government actors. The PCM accepts the actor hypothesis, framed in this paper as 
hypothesis 3, that collaboration ties in governing the MRG urban watershed is driven by 
federal and state government actor activities. These policy actors have greater capacities 
and access to more resources and power to influence coordination and cooperation 
mechanisms in policy decisions. The BIC of the DCM (12, 006), although better than that 
of the naïve model, performs poorly against the SDM. 
The SDM and PCM are combined with the political homophily term to develop the 
strategic political decision model (SPDM). The SPDM controls for the types of policy 
actors, the types of collaboration ties they form (bonding and/or bridging social capitals), 
whether such collaboration ties are influenced by their participation in collaborative 
groups, and whether they consider it strategic to collaborate with similar policy actors. Like 
the SDM, the SPDM shows decentralization (positive and statistically significant GWD 
parameter), building bonding ties (positive and statistically significant GWESP parameter), 
positive and statistically significant term for the number of (#) participation groups, and 
negative and statistically significant term for the square of #Participation Groups. We see 
that only federal government actors have statistically significant higher levels of activity 
compared to local government actors. This suggests that strategic political decisions in 
collaboration are best made by federal governments which have relatively more access to 
greater capacities and access to more resources and power. Again, the SPDM also supports 
hypothesis 4 that political homophily drives collaboration ties in governing the MRG urban 
watershed. The SPDM is a better model of explaining the MRG’s collaborative policy 




The final model includes the variable of interest, the functional polycentric 
governance term, to the SPDM to develop the strategic political-economy decision model 
(SPEDM). This is the best fitting model (with the lowest BIC) of the observed collaborative 
policy network in governing the MRG’s urban watershed. The goodness-of-fit for this 
mode is shown in Figure 4.6. It tests for model degeneracy (Handcock, 2003; Kolaczyk, 
2009). The three plots in Figure 6 show that the SPEDM is a good fit since simulated 
networks from this model closely matches the sparseness of the observed MRG 
collaborative policy network (shown as the solid line in all the three plots).   
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Figure 4.6: Goodness-of-Fit Diagnostics for the SPEDM 
 
 
Consistent with the SPDM, the SPEDM shows positive and statistically significant 
#participation groups, negative and statistically significant square of #Participation 
Groups, and positive and statistically significant political homophily. Apart from it being 
a strong, positive and statistically significant predictor of collaboration ties, the inclusion 
of the functional polycentric index brings to the fore two results. Firstly, unlike the SDM 
and the SPDM, the GWD term is negative and statistically significant. This supports the 
first hypothesis that high centralization (bridging social capital) drives collaboration ties 
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between policy actors. Secondly, state government actors and SWCDs are the only policy 
actors with significantly higher level of activity than local government actors. Therefore, 
the SPEDM supports all the hypotheses except for the third hypothesis. It does not support 
wholly the hypothesis that collaboration ties in governing the MRG urban watershed is 
driven by federal and state government actors. These two and the other SPEDM results will 
be the focus in the paper’s discussion section.  
 
 
4.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
There are two key findings which explain the dynamics of interorganizational 
collaboration within a polycentric ecology of water policy games in governing the MRG 
urban watershed. Firstly, the SPEDM results show that collaboration is driven by 
polycentric governance because it satisfies the dual conditions of segmentation and a 
statistically significant functional polycentric governance parameter. Recall that the 
segmentation condition (hypothesis 6a) means negative and statistically significant 
bridging social capital (centralization) as well as positive and statistically significant 
bonding social capital/transitive closure (decentralization)—the Lubell-Robins-Wang 
polycentric hypothesis (Lubell et al. 2014). Hypothesis 6a, in essence, is a breakdown and 
support of hypotheses 1 (centralization) and 2 (decentralization). Again, a positive and 
statistically significant polycentric index means that the probability of a collaboration tie 
between policy actors improves when policy actors make strategic decisions to connect 
with other policy actors operating within different sectors and at different governing scales 
within the system. In the SPEDM, the odds of observing a collaborating tie between two 
policy actors increases by 11% with a unit increase in a policy actor’s polycentric index—
that is, if a policy actor makes a strategic decision to connect with a policy actor operating 
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with a different sector and at a different governing scale. Policy actors make strategic 
collaboration decisions bounded by the constraints and opportunities presented within their 
politico-economic environment.  
The segmentation hypothesis unpacks the coupling of hierarchical and non-
hierarchical relationships as policy actors wrestle with coordination and cooperation 
dilemmas in governing social-ecological systems. The support of the segmentation 
hypothesis by the SPEDM and Lubell et al.’s (2014, p. 7) “strategic geography model” 
shows that the EG framework is about the synergy of, not tradeoff between (Berardo & 
Scholz, 2010), centralization and decentralization. The co-existence of hierarchical and 
non-hierarchical institutions promotes institutional diversity (Ostrom, 2005). This creates 
opportunities for policy learning and innovation (i.e. trial-and-error evolutionary process) 
as policy actors find the “institutional fit” to address coordination and cooperation 
dilemmas in governing complex social-ecological systems like the MRG’s urban 
watershed (Lebel, Nikitina, Pahl-Wostl, & Knieper, 2013; Lubell et al., 2014; E. Ostrom, 
2005).  
The co-constitution of hierarchical and non-hierarchical relational structures within 
the MRG’s ecology of water policy games also highlights the argument that polycentricity 
exists within monocentricity and vice versa (McGinnis, 1999; V. Ostrom, 1999[1972]). 
The SPEDM shows strong centralization (coefficient of -0.78) compared to 
decentralization (coefficient of 0.33). This conveys a core-periphery collaborative policy 
network structure segmented into a chain of smaller cohesive (decentralized) subgroup 
areas within the network (Robins, Pattison, et al., 2007). In other words, the policy network 
in governing the MRG urban watershed is polycentric within a largely monocentric system. 
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Hierarchical structures could facilitate policy actors’ effort to solve coordination and 
cooperation dilemmas through means such as: providing the needed forum for policy actors 
to dialogue and resolve conflicts; assisting in monitoring the behavior of policy actors 
especially in large social-ecological systems; and creating the needed legal and democratic 
environment to legitimize coordination and cooperation practices among policy actors 
(Lubell, 2004a; E. Ostrom, 1990, 1999a; Sarker, 2013). For instance, the MRG is currently 
part of the 19 urban watersheds selected by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
under the “Urban Waters Federal Partnership” to encourage collaboration among multiple 
organizations in revitalizing urban water resources.    
Secondly, state government actors and SWCDs are the only policy actors with 
significantly higher level of activity than local government actors within the MRG. The 
fact that SWCDs have strong significance (p-value < 0.001) compared to state government 
actors supports the view that SWCDs are well-organized and represent the more powerful 
interests in the ecology of water policy games (Lubell & Lippert, 2011; Lubell et al., 2014). 
Again, the fact that the activities of SWCDs and state government actors become 
significant in the SPEDM points to two issues about the role of polycentrism in MRG’s 
ecology of urban water policy games. Firstly, the activities of policy actors within an EG 
framework is best captured if we control for their strategic collaboration decisions across 
multiple scales and multiple sectors. That is, the actor hypothesis must account for the 
scale(s) and sector(s) within which policy actors operate. Federal government actors in the 
PCM and the SPDM were highly active compared to local government actors probably 
because their connections were mainly to themselves (connecting to actors within the same 
federal governing scale) and/or to other government actors (connecting to actors within the 
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same political sector). Secondly, a polycentric ecology of urban water policy games, shown 
in the case of the MRG collaborative policy network, implies that traditional hierarchical 
institutional structures (e.g. state government actors and SWCDs) help to solve 
coordination and cooperation dilemmas if they collaborate with policy actors across 
multiple governing scales and within multiple sectors. 
4.9 Conclusion  
This paper brings together several hypotheses derived from the ecology of games literature 
to examine the governance of an urban watershed. However, there are still many 
unknowns. For instance, it is important to explore how these hypotheses might still hold in 
different urban watersheds both within the U.S. and international contexts. Doing so could 
assist with the development of a meta-theory of governance dynamics within the EG 
framework. Again, engaging polycentric governance methodologically is often hijacked 
by the fuzziness in defining the concept. This paper contributes by integrating multiple 
conceptual and epistemological traditions to frame and provide a robust test of polycentric 
governance (see also Author, forthcoming). Future research is aimed at exploring this area 
especially within the EG framework. Finally, future research could test interesting 
hypotheses on polycentric governance within the urban ecology of water policy games 
(emergence and dissolution of ties within a polycentric system) using longitudinal data. A 
dynamic network model or an agent-based network model holds promise to test whether 





 CHAPTER V CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
  More than four decades after Hardin’s (1968) seminal piece, the (under)supply of 
institutions to govern social-ecological systems has been an enduring discourse among 
(neo)institutional economics, political science, environmental and allied scholars. E. 
Ostrom’s (1990) challenge of the prevailing orthodoxy—the state-market institutional 
prescriptions—marked a critical juncture in the literature on how to govern social-
ecological systems. Based on the famous IAD framework and design principles, Ostrom 
and other scholars argued that there are certain conditions animating actors to collaborate 
and cooperate to self-govern their commons (Cox, Sadiraj, & Sadiraj, 2008; E. Ostrom, 
1999b, 2005, 2007; Edella Schlager, 1994). Other frameworks such as the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994; Sabatier, 1988, 1998) and 
Institutional Collaborative Action (ICA) framework (Feiock & Scholz, 2009; Feiock et al., 
2009), often seen as complementary to the IAD Framework (Edella Schlager, 2007), also 
proffer conditions under which actors collaborate and cooperate in governing social-
ecological systems. In other words, the ‘basket of institutions’ that could be supplied to 




The ecology of games framework, an update of Norton Long’s “ecology of games”, 
builds on the IAD and other frameworks to explain the conditions under which 
collaboration and cooperation emerge among actors. It presents itself as framework that 
supports and synthesizes multiple theories and methods—meta theory and method 
framework of governance dynamics. Presented as “a theory of polycentric governance”, 
Lubell (2013, p. 538) centralizes an important cornerstone, a defining feature of the 
Bloomington School of Political Economy, of the IAD framework: there is  no panacea in 
governing social-ecological systems; in reality, an effective governing systems is 
constituted by polycentric public economies involving a diversity of instittuonal 
arrangements(E. Ostrom, 2000; 2010b, p. 552). The essays in this dissertation 1) offered 
both theoretical and methodological means to enact polycentric public economies within 
the ecology of games framework, and 2) explicated the conditions under which 
interoganizational collaboration is fostered within a polycentric ecology of policy games 
in governing the Middle Rio Grande urban watershed. The next sections of the chaper 
delineates the specific theoretical, methodological and policy contributions of the essays. 
The discussions here are interlaced with suggestions for future research. 
5.2 Theoretical Constributions 
Chapter two explicated the conceptual tenets of a polycentric urban water 
governance system by synthesizing three theoretical efforts on polycentric governance, 
polycentric urban regions, and SENA framework. First, the chapter contibutes to the 
literature by offering conceptual bridges among hirtherto disparate theoretical efforts in 
political science, (neo)institutional economics, spatial planning, environmental 
management and conservation biology. In social-ecological research, scholars such as 
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Collins et al. (2011) have long called for scholarships that cross disciplinary lines to “bridge 
the biophysical and social domains” (see also E. Ostrom, 2007; Edella Schlager, 2007). 
The relevance and implications of polycentric governance in social-ecological research 
relies on such interdisciplinary efforts to minimize conceptual and definitional ambiguity 
and fuzziness which also cripples methodological and empirical engagements of 
polycentric governance.  
Second, the delineated five tenets of polycentric water governance offers theoretical 
refinement to the ecology of games framework. Specifically, polycentricity in the ecology 
of games should, among others, be specific as to the 1) existence of multiple actors, 2) 
presence of functional linkages between these actors, 3) embeddness of actors within geo-
political jurisdictions (i.e. ecolocial units) which represents multiple governing scales, 4) 
relative autonomy of actors within the governing system even as they form scale bridging 
ties with other actors, and 5) operaton of actors within multiple sectors—islands of 
polycentric order. In its current form, the ecology of games framework addresses the first 
two but not the remaining three conditions (see Lubell, 2013; Lubell et al., 2010; Lubell et 
al., 2014). 
 Third, by incorporating these five tenets into the ecology of games framework, we 
begin to properly contextualize the centrality of power and resource distribution within this 
framework, at least in the case of the MRG. As shown in the third chapter, despite the 
presence of more nonprofit actors than political and market actors within the MRG, more 
connections (SMBEs) are formed with political actors. We also see that the density of 
SMBEs is relatively higher between local-regional (political) actors than between local-
local actors. Again, an actor’s FPGI is positively and significantly related to its political 
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influence (closeness centrality) and ability to control information flow 
(technical/information capacity) within the network (betweenness centrality). Describing 
the ecology of games framework as a theory of polycentric governance, especially in 
governing social-ecological systems, should centralize the politics of power and resource 
distribution (see Bulkeley, 2005; Huitema et al., 2009; McGinnis, 2011). In fact, the fourth 
chapter makes this point more explicitly when the SPEDM results showed that, compared 
to local government actors, the probability of collaborative ties forming between actors 
within the MRG increases with the presence and activities of state government actors and 
SWCDs. The role of these traditional, hierarchical and political authorities in solving 
collaboration and cooperation dilemmas in governing social-ecological systems needs 
further exploration by scholars working at the nexus of social-ecological systems and 
polycentric governance (see examples of such needed works in DeCaro et al., forthcoming; 
Sarker, 2013).  
Finally, describing the ecology of games as a theory of polycentric governance 
requires incorporating both form (structure) and agentic (decisions/actions of actors) 
aspects of human-ecological processes. A governing structure appears polycentric when it 
is composed of centralized and decentralized institutional arrangements—discussed in the 
fourth chapter as the segmentation or the Lubell-Wang-Robins hypothesis (Lubell et al., 
2014). The current version of ecology of games, therefore, privileges the structure formed 
over the continuous strategic decisions and actions of actors in creating the overall 
polycentric governing structure. The result, then, is to fall into a teleological explanation 
of why the ecology of games could be described as a theory of polycentric theory.  As the 
SPEDM results shows, the following speaks little or nothing about the role of polycentric 
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governance in the MRG’s collaborative policy network: the segmented nature of 
collaborative policy network; and the existence of multiple federal, state, local, business, 
nonprofit, and market actors within the MRG governing system. However, the role of 
polycentric governance in interogranizational collaboration becomes clear when we 
account for their FPGI—the strategic decisions of actors as they with other actors operating 
within different sectors and at different governing scales within the governing system. 
More of such micro-analytic lens is needed to understand how a polycentric governing 
system is continuously shaped as a result of the ‘unintended’ and boundedly rational 
decisions and actions of actors as they collaborate and cooperate in governing the 
commons. 
5.3 Methdological Contributions 
The third and fourth chapters provide methodological tools, grounded in social 
network theory and analysis, and SENA, to contextualize defining concepts and debates in 
the literature on polycentrism. For instance, Aligica and Tarko (2012) and  V. Ostrom 
(1999[1972]) notes that the argument that polycentric governance shapes and is also shaped 
by polycentric order within multiple pulsating polycentric domains needs to made explicit 
through empirical testing. However, they aver that “Not only that a proper language and 
concepts needed to map, describe, and analyze polycentric systems were lacking, but even 
worse, the existent language in political science was deeply contaminated by the 
monocentric vision…That meant that the existent conceptual frameworks and their 
associated vocabulary needed to be tested, refocused, and reconfigured in way that would 
make their limits and preconceptions explicit” (Aligica & Tarko, 2012, p. 248). In other 
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words, we are faced with questions like how do we provide the empirics of 1) these multiple 
pulsating domains, and 2) the interactions between these domains?  
Chapter 3 uses social network and SENA methods to provide three pulsating 
domains in governing the MRG urban water commons—political, nonprofit, and market 
polycentric orders. The chapter also uses bivariate regression to test the relationships 
among these pulsating domains. However, as noted in the chapter, there is more to the 
dynamic relationship among these polycentric domains, as discussed by V. Ostrom 
(1999[1972]) and Aligica and Tarko (2012). This chapter begins the process of dealing 
with the dynamics. Dynamic network models and agent-based simulations could be used 
in this regard to explore 1) how polycentrism (both actor- and system-level FPGI) evolves, 
and 2) how islands of polycentric orders are constituted as a result of actors’ strategic 
decisions and (re)alignments of interests over time.  
Again, the fourth chapter also provides a methodological approach to contextualize 
the debate about the normative goal of polycentrism. Some scholars have challenged the 
normative focus of polycentrism (e.g. Davoudi, 2003; Huitema et al., 2009) and others, 
such as social-ecological scholars (e.g. Chaffin et al., 2014; Cosens & Williams, 2012; 
Folke, 2007; Folke et al., 2005) also prescribe it as a key institutional arrangement for 
adaptive and resilient social-ecological systems. Somewhere in-between these bifurcated 
arguments are other scholars who believe that polycentrism needs to be made analytically 
relevant through 1) moving beyond the normative and descriptive and 2) engaging it with 
more empirical tests (e.g. Green, 2007; Lieberman, 2011; Lubell, 2013). This also means 
moving beyond system level analysis of polycentrism by examining the actions and 
decisions of the actors who shape and are shaped by the system. This gets us closer to the 
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Polanyi (1951) logic of polycentrism—a governing system centered on individuals and the 
exercise of their autonomy and liberty in opinions as they make strategic decisions.  
The FPGI, a scalable index measuring both individual- and system-level 
polycentrism and as used in the SPEDM in the fourth chapter shows that the probability of 
interorganizational collaboration increases when we control for actor level FPGI—actors’ 
strategic decision to connect with others within different sectors and at different governing 
scales. Thus, by engaging polycentrism as an analytical concept, this dissertation can make 
a normative claim, in the case of the MRG, that the probability of interorganizational 
collaboration in governing the urban water commons increases as a result of polycentrism. 
But more empirical evidence is needed across multiple contexts and temporalities before 
such normative claims can be concretized and generalized.  
5.4 Conclusion: No Panacea! 
It goes without saying that this dissertation resists the temptation to offer panacea 
in governing the urban water commons. In terms of policy contribution, the results from 
the dissertation (specifically the SPEDM in chapter 4) shows that both centralized and 
decentralized institutional arrangements support inter-organizational collaboration in 
urban water resource governance. This generally supports the Ostrom logic that there is no 
one-size-fit-all solution (e.g. institutions and/or policies) to govern social-ecological 
resources. Again, the activities of traditional hierarchical organizations, state and SWCDs 
in the case of the MRG, also support interorganizational collaboration. The supports 
provided by these traditional hierarchical organizations, such as support in the form of 
technical, information, and financial resources as well as serving as an avenue to resolve 
conflicts from these organizations, are potentially vital policy interventions in dealing with 
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collaboration and cooperative dilemmas in restoring, managing, and sustaining social-
ecological systems (see also Lubell, 2004b; Robins, Bates, & Pattison, 2011). Again, 
actors’ participation in collaborative organizations also increases the probability of 
interorganizational collaboration among actors within the MRG. Sponsoring collaborative 
groups, such as the Federal Urban Watershed Partnership by the U.S. EPA, should still be 
viable policy options in dealing with ecological planning and restoration efforts (see also 
Lubell et al., 2002; Weible, Sabatier, & Lubell, 2004). The policy path to governing the 
urban water commons are many and the onus till lies with researchers and policy makers 
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Appendix 1: Ranking of Actors Based on their index in the Islands of Polycentric Order 
Category Political Polycentric Order Nonprofit Polycentric Order Market Polycentric Order 
Index > 50% 
USEPA Friends of Valle de Oro  Friends of Valle de Oro  
Pueblo of Isleta USFWS City of Albuquerque 
USNPS   
Pueblo of Santa Ana   
USGS   
USFWS   
Pueblo of Sandia   
USHUD   
City of Albuquerque   
USBR   
USDoT   
USACE   
USEDA   
Index 50% - 
20% 
Pueblo of San Felipe USEPA City of Rio Rancho 
MRGCD City of Albuquerque City of Santa Fe 
County of Bernalillo NMDGF USEDA 
Pueblo of Cochiti U. New Mexico USACE 
NMISC County of Bernalillo USBR 
Pueblo of Santo Domingo Albuquerque Public Schools USFWS 
NMDGF 
Bosque Ecosystem Monitoring 
Program  NMED 
ABCWUA USGS NMDGF 
USBLM EEANM NM Water Collaborative 
Nature Conservancy  USEPA  
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AMAFCA   
NMAD   
USHS   
USNWS   
NMED   
NM Office of the State Engineer    
City of Rio Rancho   
U. New Mexico   
PNM Resources   
Bosque Initiative Group   
Sierra Club   
Friends of Valle de Oro    
City of Bernalillo   
NMDoT   
NMAGO   
Save Our Bosque Task Force   
NMSLO   
Adubon New Mexico   
Ducks Unlimited    
Village of Corrales   
Santafe County   
SSCAFCA   
USBIA   
Laguna Pueblo   
City of Socorro   









Category Functional Polycentric Governance Index 
Index > 50% 
Friends of Valle de Oro  
USEPA 
USFWS 
Index 50% - 20% 
City of Albuquerque 
USGS 
Pueblo of Isleta 
Pueblo of Santa Ana 




Pueblo of Sandia 
USACE 




Pueblo of Cochiti 
NMED 
Note:  Actors are listed in descending order.  Those with index below 20% were left out. 
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